

1942

BRITISH EMBASSY, BAGDAD.

FO624/28

No.: 152

PART TWO

FROM 31 - 80

Name of File:—

IRAN

KURDS

(No minutes to be written here.)

LAST Year's File No.: ✓

16

NEXT Year's File No.: _____

Iran: Kurds.

152/80/42

(152/80/42)

22nd April, 1942.

152
77,8
42

Dear Lyon,

We have had reports from Kermanshah which show that the Ustadar returned to his headquarters on 13th April from his visit to Kurdistan to meet the tribal leaders.

2. He stated that he was received with marked honour by the chiefs and enjoyed the friendship of Karim Beg, son of Jafar Sultan.

3. The Kurds put forward demands, of which the chief were

- (a) Karim Beg to be Farmandar,
- (b) Bakhsdars and Amniyah to be Kurds,
- (c) schools to be opened,
- (d) roads to be improved to enable local produce to be sent to Kermanshah.

4. The Kurds declared their willingness to give hostages for good behaviour, but asked for the release of a number of chiefs still held in Tehran.

5. The Ustadar has stated that he will ask the Government at Tehran to give him authority to accept these terms.

6. His Majesty's Consul foresees however that Shahbakti may insist that the surrender of rifles should be a condition of settlement with the Kurds and he fears that if this happens it will be difficult to make peace.

Yours sincerely,

(SIGNED) V. HOLT.

VH
RK
VH

LT-COLONEL W. A. LYON, C.B.E.

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120
Subject:-

KURDISTAN.

From: Kurds

152/79/42.

No. G.S."I"/215/I'(a).
H.Q. TENTH ARMY.
18 April 1942.

To:-

H.M. Embassy,
Baghdad.



The attached copy of Lt-Col. Fletcher's letter
No.13A/PA of 10 April 42 is passed to you please, with the
request that you might very kindly furnish the information
required.

Revised
(S av - 18/4/42)
INDEX

R. Jackson Capt
Lt-Col.
G.S."I".

G.W.M.
18/4.

Copy of Letter No.13A/PA dated 10th April 1942, from P.A.
KERMANSHAH to H.Q. TENTH ARMY.

Subject:- KURDISTAN.

Recent information of the attitude of the Kurds leads me to think that they might possibly come to terms with the Persian Government if they were to be treated in the same manner as the Kurds in IRAQ are treated by their Government.

2. I am completely ignorant of the **manner** in which Iraqi Kurdistan is administered, of the system of taxation etc, and of the provision of schools and hospitals. It would I think be useful to have this information here should negotiations start between the Kurds and the Persians. If I can be supplied with a note explaining the system of administration in Iraqi Kurdistan, with particular regard to the part taken in it by the Kurds themselves I shall be very grateful.

Qaran : Kua do 152 78 42.



Copy of Act
to His
Majesty's
Minister
Forwarded, for information, to His
Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid,
with the compliments of Mr.
Consul at Keweenaw.

British Columbia, ~~At~~ ¹¹ The Esplanade
Kemano 8000
15-Apr. 1942. (3111) 1000

65. *On the way to
inland 1915.*

20.4 *W. Edwards Bee
INDEX*

day we were about
8000 steps at the same
heights and to
bring immediate
pressure (there on
Kam Bay) *W* 1914

SECRET

British Consulate
Kermanshah.
April 15th. 1942.

Despatch No. 55.

Sir,

I have the honour to confirm my telegram No. 50 of the 14th April, and to forward herewith copy of the Political Adviser's telegram to the Military Attaché at Tehran referred to therein, describing briefly the result of the Ustander's first contact with the dissident Kurdish leaders. I have also to report that the Ustander (accompanied by the Farmandar) called on me this morning and gave me an account of his journey to the Paveh district; this account closely corresponds to that given by Lt.-Col. Fletcher in his telegram referred to above.

2. From the Ustander's description of the welcome he received in Kurdistan he appears to enjoy the confidence and friendship of the Kurds and especially of Kerim Beg, the eldest son and successor of Jasfar Sultan to the headship of the Avromani Kurds. As far as the restoration of order in that area of Kurdistan is concerned there should be little difficulty; indeed, the Ustander assured me that order already existed there and that, under Kerim Beg it should be a simple matter to bring that part of Kurdistan under the control of the Iranian Government, provided that a number of concessions - reasonable Kurdish demands for the most part - are made by the Iranian Authorities. He intended to send to Tehran the demands addressed to him by the Kurdish dissidents - the latter include representatives of a large number of influential tribes - including the Waladbegi and the Ghebadi - and he proposed recommending that everything possible be done to satisfy these Kurds. By showing clearly to the latter that the Iranian Government is animated with a sincere desire to redress their legitimate grievances he hopes to influence the other Kurdish leaders - like Hama Rashid, whose influence extended over areas further north, to come to terms. If Hama Rashid and his companions saw that the Kurds in the Paveh district were being reasonably treated it was very likely that they too would agree to come to terms. He did not intend to get in touch with Hama Rashid until he had settled with the leaders of the group of Kurdish tribes contacted by him on the 11/13th April; he hoped that the Iranian Government would give him wide powers to make whatever concessions seemed to be necessary.

3. He mentioned that 1 heavy and 2 light machine guns had been pressed upon him by Kerim Beg who stated that he had 6 heavy and 12 light machine guns in his area; from remarks he had heard he estimated that the Kurds had between 5,000 and 6,000 rifles in their possession. He had, however, considered it unwise at the first interview with the Kurdish leaders, to demand the surrender of rifles as a preliminary condition for a settlement with the Kurds. The point is, however, bound to crop up when detailed discussions with the Kurds begin, within the next few days. General Shahbakhti shews any uncompromising attitude towards this question he may make the Ustander's task of pacification more difficult; it is to be hoped therefore that too much importance will not be attached to the immediate surrender of arms. Indeed, I am of opinion that the possessions of arms by the Kurds - who are generally pro-British in sentiment -

is

Sir Reader W. Bullard. K.C.M.G. C.I.E.
His Majesty's Minister.
British Legation
Tehran.

is not by any means undesirable for if the Iranian Army did under certain unpredictable circumstances, seek to harass the British Army in Iran the Kurds might if encouraged to do so be useful in helping us against the Iranian troops whom they hate so bitterly.

4. The Ustandar asked ~~me~~ today to assist him in deciding what reforms ought to be carried out in Kurdistan and in examining the grievances of the Kurds. I explained to him that while I was always ready to give advice or assistance, I was debarred from intervening in the Kurdish question as H.M. Government had all along adopted a policy of non-intervention. He asked me whether if I could take no official action I could not at least give him the benefit of my private advice. I agreed to let him know my personal views regarding the pacification of Kurdistan but made it clear that I could not sit on any Commission which might be formed later on to examine the Kurdish grievances and claims. I trust that you will approve of the above action. As I realise the importance of avoiding any action which might be construed as British intervention, I shall give advice in general terms only and shall emphasise the fact that the views expressed by me are purely personal and private and do not in any way necessarily represent those of H. M's Legation.

5. I have sent copies of this despatch to H.M.'s Ambassador at Bagdad to the G.O.C. 6th Indian Division and to the Political Adviser at Kermanshah.

I have the honour to be
Sir,

With great respect
Your most obedient
humble servant,

(Sgd.) J.R. Vaughan-Russell

H.B.M. Consul.

Copy of tel No. I3A/PA of the 13th April. 1942

From Political Adviser

To: Britmilat HG. 6th Ind. Div.

Copies to

H.B.M. Consul (2)

26th Ind Inf. Bde.

H.G. Tenth Army.

My telegram of 11th April. Kurdistan. Ustandar returned today. He visited Pavah (Fawall) and saw Karim Beg and other leaders, who received him with marked honour. Kurds have formulated demands of which chief are (a) Karim Beg to be Farmandar of Avroman area. (b) Bakshdars and Amnich to be Kurds. (c) Schools to be opened. (d) Roads to be improved to enable local produce to reach Kermanshah. Kurds are willing give hostages for good behaviou and ask for release of following now held in Tehran. (i) Mohd Beg son of Abdur Rahman Beg of Jananhud. Mohammad Beg, Amir Asad, Babajani. (iii) Hassan Beg, Babajani son of Amir Asad (iv) Suleiman Beg, Babajani brother of Amir Asad. (v) Fathullah Beg, brother Karim Beg and son of Jaffar Sultan. (vi) Mohammad Ali Beg, brother of above. (vii) Ali Mohd Beg, brother of above. (viii) Mohd Beg Lahuni, cousin of Jaffar Sultan. In addition release of 10 retainers of above. People of Jawanrud ask for release of four Curan leaders as follows. Bahram Khan, Rachid - Us - Sultaneh Kakkhani. (II) Qadir Beg. (III) Rashid Agha brother of above (iv) Jahan Beg son of Kalkhani. Para 2 I suggest that it might be wise to get promised hostages before making further releases and that in case of Kalkhanis releases might be contingent on handing over arms. As Jahangie and other Kalkhanis have been raiding and are on our l of c. Para 3. Karim Beg has sent his brother Mansur to Kmo with Ustandar. Ustandar was impressed with law and order in rebel areas and is obviously in favour of meeting Kurdish requests. No mention was made to the Kurds to the handing over arms. Shahbakti may insist on this stop.

Para. 4. I consider that there is chance of settling matters without further fighting . We are likely to be asked to assist . Risk of becoming involved by playing part of friendly disinterested adviser is in my opinion less than that of being involved by attack by Kurds on Senandaj. This is matter of policy . for His Majesty's Legation to decide .

152
Iran: Kurds 152/72/42

TELEGRAM.

How received.

From : H. M. CONSUL
KERMANSHAH

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

PARAP

Copies to : G.O.C
A.O.C
C.I.C.I

Despatched : 16.4. 2100

Received : 17.4. 0900

Decyphered : 17.4. 1310

No. 22

of 16.4.42.

Addressed to TEHRAN No.51.

Rptd. Foreign Office No.21
Cairo No.18 for Minister of State
Bagdad No.22.

Chrus
Adl
COL
CIC

SMK/JAM
JB
RK

✓

Sur

I have not discouraged the Iranian G.O.C. and Governor-General from seeking a conciliatory settlement with the Kurds. On the contrary, the Governor-General's successful preliminary contact with the Kurds last week is largely the result of my numerous efforts to persuade the Iranian authorities here to avoid prolongation of the struggle and to attempt satisfactory settlement as a result of discussion.

2. From frank statements made to me today by Manbre, the son of Jaafar Sultan who accompanied the Governor-General on his return from Kurdistan April 13th a large percentage of Kurds still mistrust Iranian promise and might refuse the terms offered to them unless British assurances are given that if the Iranian Government does not fulfil the terms eventually agreed upon, the Kurds will obtain satisfaction through our intervention.

3. Pending further instructions, I am taking no further action. I am continuing to emphasise that British policy has always been and is still one of non-intervention.

Re
10/4
10/4
10/4
10/4

INDEX

MINUTE SHEET.

Reference

H.E. ✓ W
15.4

15th April 1942.

Y.E. is aware that for some time past there have been strong rumours of Russian activity among the Kurds in Iran and even though these have been indignantly denied officially by Russia there seems very little doubt that in fact something has been going on.

I am now informed by Chapman (who of course is anxious that his name should be kept out of it) that he has had definite confirmation that the Russians are active in Persian Kurdistan from two Kurdish friends in whose word he places full confidence. One of them has already confirmed to him the truth of the story that certain Kurdish leaders were invited to Tiflis and handsomely treated, and he now adds that from among the Kurdish leaders the Russians have chosen Sa'id Abdullah as President of the "Kurdish Republic". This choice has met with agreement of the other Kurdish notables.

Another friend has just informed him that:

- 1) The Russians are telling the Kurds that even if the British are obliged to evacuate Iran and Iraq they intend to hold on in the areas already occupied by them.
- 2) That arrangements are being made with Kurds to learn Russian and for selected Russians to learn Kurdish.
- 3) That the flag for the "Kurdish Republic" will probably be a rising sun in white on a red background.

Meanwhile the Russians are carrying on an intensive anti-Nazi propaganda among the Persian Kurds and in spite of their official denials they seem to be taking every possible measure, even if only outwardly unofficially, to ensure Kurdish loyalty before the Germans make their usual false promises.



Iran: Kurds

152 (75) 42.

~~SECRET~~

Serial No. 320
Tel No. 0373
Date:- 12/4
From:- 6 IND DIV.
To:- TENTH ARMY
Rptd:- P.A. K.M.S.

152 (73) 42. REF P A K M S SIGNAL 13/A 12 APR. PATROL CONTACTED KARIM BEG AT PAWALI B 2347 138E 6 APR FOUND HIM MOST FRIENDLY AND WELL DISPOSED TO BRITISH AND HOPING FOR BRITISH RULE BUT NOTHING BAD ENOUGH FOR PERSIANS PARTICULARLY PRESENCE ANY PERSIAN TPS WITH THEIR ROBBERY AND LOOTING. ADMITTED UNDER HIS CONTROL RIFLES TWO THOUSAND IN VILLAGE AND TWELVE THOUSAND IN AREA. NO MENTION ADVANCE AGAINST PERSIANS SENANDAJ OR ELSEWHERE BUT HATRED SUCH THAT NO PERSIAN EMISSARY TO HIM SAFE UNLESS SAFE CONDUCT REQUESTED OR OBVIOUSLY REQUIRED BY BRITISH. STATE EXPECTING VISIT FROM FLETCHER FOR WHOM AS WELL AS FOR SPENCER LETTER FEET WITH HIM BY LYON.

+ He has seen
152 (75) 42

Distribution:-G (OPS), G.S.(I), BRITISH EMBASSY.

J. H. Allen AK
Condr S.M.C. 16/4

Iran : Kurds 152 | 74 | 42.

TELEGRAM.

How Sent

PARAP

Copies

Sent To:

From : **H. M. AMBASSADOR.**
BAGDAD.

To: **H. M. MINISTER, TEHRAN.**

Date 13th April, 1942.

No. 93

Time Despatched 13.4. 1250.

✓

152 | 66 | 42

{ Your telegram No. 90.

According to reports received here, the
Russians have sent an occasional patrol to Khanah
but nothing more.

CORNWALLIS

VH
RD
JB
RK

6/4/42

INDEX

He/Wh 1st. 11

152/73/242

~~that~~

I have pointed out to Col
 Boyce that Ham Beg
 was released from prison

8911 14/4 in Persia. That his presence

in the Turman is therefore
 no affair of ours, moreover

he is reported to be

~~that~~ one of the better educated

of the Turman chief tuis to

Y. as Shahbakhto states,

the Persian Govt are

seeking an understanding

with the Kurdish tribes
Kam Beg should be
a useful man for them to
get in touch with.

65 You agreed that
immediate pressure from
you on Kam Beg was not
a practical proposition.

10/4/64

152

Lian : Kurds

152 | 73 | 42

SECRET

Serial No:-
 Priority:-
 Telegram No:-
 Date:-
 Date received:-
 From:-
 To:-
 Repeated:-

563
 IMMEDIATE.
 13A/HA
 12/4
 12/4
 Political Agent K.M.S.
 TENTH ARMY
 6 Div. British Military Attaché Tenth Army



Shahbakti told me on 11/4 that kurds have united and made plans to attack and take Sennaraj after which they will open negotiations (.) Kurds from AVROMAN and MARIVAN under KARIMBEG son JAFFAH Sultan will take part (.) SHAHBAKTI has obtained details their plan and made disposition to meet attack if it materializes (.) He said he did not want to fight but if attacked would give Kurds a good knock (.) On 10/4th Persian aeroplane dropped leaflets containing announcement of Persian Government Policy towards tribes and impending visit of USTANDAR who left for AVROMAN 11/4 to see KARIMBEG (.)

2. Suggest immediate pressure from Iraq to RESTRAIN KARIMBEG (.) Colonel LYON could probably assist.

* By change
 + As received.

Distribution:-

B.G.S., 6(Ops) 6(Int), British Embassy Bd.

J. H. Allen
 Condr. S.M.C.

PMJ
 12/4

Man. Kurds

152/72/42.

~~SECRET~~

No. C/11/38.

POLITICAL ADVISER'S OFFICE,
NORTHERN AREA.

Kirkuk, 10th April, 1942.

W. Holt
News Dept NH
newspaper



Reference your 152/68/42 of

7th instant, the Russians have sent an occasional patrol to Khanah but nothing more.

Yours sincerely
W. Holt

Capt: W. Holt, O.M.G., C.V.O.,
Oriental Secretary,
British Embassy,
Baghdad.

Tel

Extract from letter No. 13A/PA dated 21 Mar 42 from Political Adviser, KERMANSHAH.

Both the Ustandar and his assistant consider that it is not too late to open negotiations with the Kurds and influential landowners in SENANDAJ have expressed the same opinion. As I have no indication of the present state of feeling amongst the Kurds I cannot say whether they would be prepared to negotiate or not. I, however, now agree with H.B.M. Consul that an effort should be made to start negotiations. General Shahbakti considers that the co-operation of the Iraq Govt. is essential in any operations he may undertake. He maintains that MOHD RASHID has still got plenty of relations in IRAQ. He considers that if they were to be rounded up, and if MOHD RASHID'S property in IRAQ were to be seized, he could be persuaded to return there. He also said that the Persian Govt. should offer to buy MOHD RASHID'S property in IRAN at a good price on condition that MOHD RASHID should leave IRAN. On his return to IRAQ the IRAQI Govt. should take action to make his return to IRAN impossible and should then restore his Iraqi property and release his relations. Should MOHD RASHID refuse the Persian offer the Iraqi Govt should post strong forces on the border so that, when the Persian forces drive MOHD RASHID back he and his followers will be unable to escape over the IRAQ frontier. I am very doubtful whether this idea of buying MOHD RASHID'S properties in IRAN is practicable. I do however consider that the IRAQ Govt could, and should, take more active steps on the lines indicated by General Shahbakti. Fears of the loss of his Iraqi property and of reprisals on his relations, together with the possibility of Persian military action against him succeeding as it has already once done, might at least induce MOHD RASHID to open negotiations.

Copy to:- Embassy.

Colonel Paton T. A.
General Staff.

SECRET.
No. G/330.
Gen Staff Branch.
H.Q. TENTH ARMY.
4 Apr 42.



152

Iran : Kurds 152/70/42.

TELEGRAM.

How received.

PARAP

See J. E. K.

From : BRITISH CONSUL
KERMANSHAH

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

Copies to : A.O.C.
 G.O.C.
 C.I.C.I. (2)

Despatched : 8.4. 1800
Received : 9.4. 0830
Decyphered : 9.4. 0910

No. 20

of 8th April, 1942.

Addressed to TEHRAN No. 45.

Rptd. Bagdad No. 20.

152/62/42
Circular.

My telegram No. 43 and your telegram No. 13

The Iranian Government declaration of tribal
policy not yet generally known here, therefore local
reaction so far negligible.

2. I saw the Governor General and the Iranian
G.O.C. today and suggested the Iranian Government
declaration as published in the Tehran newspapers
should be printed on leaflets and dropped over
Kurdistan. They promised to consider this suggestion
favourably especially as the Governor-General proposes
to start his tour of Kurdistan (Paveh district near
Iraq frontier to begin with) April 11th.

200 59/23/42

He/ W. A.
HOK 8/10/42

A140

Mr. Edwards
and Friends
Mr. noble
C. 14/4

CW/JP
JB
RK

File with Staff.

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An oval-shaped black ink stamp. The top arc of the oval contains the text "BRITISH EMBASSY" and the bottom arc contains "BAGDAD". In the center, the date "7 APR 1942" is stamped, with a small checkmark or "V" placed above the "P".

Despatch No. 51.

**British Consulate,
Kermanshah.**
5th April, 1942

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 43 of to-day's date, I have the honour to forward herewith extracts from a private letter which I received last night from Lt.-Col. Fletcher, the Political Adviser here, regarding proposals made to him by General SHAHBAKHTI during a conversation with him on the 3rd April, for the settlement of the Kurdish troubles by negotiation.

2. Before acquainting you with General SHAHBAKHTI's new plans for dealing with the Kurdish problem, I arranged to see the General and AMIR-i-KULL ZANGANEH, the Governor-General of the Fifth Ustan and to confirm what the Political Adviser had reported to me. I accordingly saw both the above-mentioned officials this morning and discussed the proposals which they had both referred to in conversations with the Political Adviser and with Mr. TROTT, the Oriental Secretary on the 3rd instant. Mr. Trott, who left for Senna yesterday morning, appears to have attached little importance to the proposals for he did not discuss them with me before his departure nor telegraph details of the proposals to you; I presume that he is unaware of the fact that the Ustandar intends to carry out his proposed tour of Western Kurdistan in four days' time and that the matter is therefore urgent. As, however, the suggested new plan for negotiating a settlement with the Kurds cannot be put into execution without some modification of the non-intervention policy hitherto followed by His Majesty's Government and it appears necessary to consider matters in view of General SHAHBAKHTI's welcome change of attitude, I have considered the matter of sufficient importance and urgency to telegraph to you, Sir, at some length and to send copies of the telegram to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London and to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and at Baghdad.

3. The proposals set forth in Col. Fletcher's letter to me differ slightly from those put forward to me by Gen. SHAHBAKHTI and the Ustandar this morning; point (b) in Col. Fletcher's letter should not be regarded as an alternative to point (a) but it is intended that (a) should be a preliminary to (b), viz., that Kurdish malcontents should be given an opportunity of describing their grievances to the proposed Commission here after the Ustandar has carried out his tour of Kurdistan and met the Kurdish leaders who are spokesmen on behalf of the Kurds and given them promises of a safe-conduct to Kermanshah and a formal undertaking that their legitimate grievances will be remedied by the Iranian Government.

4. It is clear that doubts are felt by the sponsors of this new scheme for arriving at a settlement of the troubles in Kurdistan - doubts as to whether the Kurds will accept the safe-conduct offered to them by the Iranian Authorities. It is for that reason that British intervention is asked for. I made clear that I could not reply to the question as to whether the British Government would, in order to facilitate a negotiated settlement, agree to intervene and I emphasised the point that non-intervention had been the key-note of British policy in Kurdistan. I would be grateful if you would let me know whether any change in British policy is contemplated and whether the Ustandar should be discouraged from making his proposed tour of Kurdistan and from promising the Kurds British safe-conducts and the redress of their legitimate grievances under the auspices of

the Anglo-Iranian Commission which it has been proposed to set up.

5. Copies of this despatch have been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Baghdad, to the G.O.C., 6th Indian Division and to Colonel Fletcher, Political Adviser here.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
With great respect,
Your most obedient,
humble servant,

SIR Reader W. Bullard, K.C.M.G., C.I.E.,
His Majesty's Minister,
British Legation,
TEHRAN.

 (signed) J.R. Vaughan-Russell
H.B.M. Consul.

Enclosure to Kermanshah despatch No. 51 of 5 Apr. 42

Extracts from a letter sent to Mr Vaughan-Russell by
Lt.-Col. Fletcher, Political Adviser, Kermanshah.

Kermanshah, 3rd Apr,

My dear V.R.

You may be interested to know that SHAHBAKHTI made the following proposals to me ref. Kurdistan this afternoon.

(a) the Kurds should be told that any Kurds with grievances should come to Kermanshah to put them before Shahbakhti, the Ustandar, you or General Thomeon. The British should guarantee their safety and immunity from arrest. Shahbakhti and I should examine their grievances and make joint recommendations to Tehran or a Commission should be established to go into complicated questions.

(b) as an alternative to (a) Amir-i-Kull should tour Kurdistan without any military or amnich escort, find out what the Kurds wanted, reassure them and promise to lay their grievances before the Persian Govt. The Kurds would not attack Amir-i-Kull or kidnap him.

(c) Shahbakhti does not want to fight the Kurds but if his troops are attacked he must fight.

(d) If something is not done soon there will be a widespread conflagration.

(e) Of the Galbaghi prisoners now being tried most will be released and only a few ringleaders will be sentenced.

2. Shahbakhti has given orders to his officers that they are free to meet our officers and has replied to General Thomson's invitation in this sense.

* * * * *

Yours..
(signed) R.W. Fletcher.

From: Thurds. 152/68/42

(152/68/42)

British Embassy,
Bagdad.

SECRET.

7th April, 1942.

Dear Lyon,

Kurdish chiefs from Ushno have visited our Consul at Tabriz and have told him that Soviet forces recently occupied the frontier post at Khansh on the Rowanduz route to Persia.

Can you confirm or deny this ?

Yours sincerely,

(SIGNED) V. Holt.

see 152/66/42.

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LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. A. LYON, O.B.E.

VH

RK

VH

30/4

152
Iran: Kurds 152/67/42.

TELEGRAM.

How received.

PARAP

3 copies

From : H.M.CONSUL,
KERMANSHAH

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

Copies to :

Despatched : 4.4. 1800

Received : 6.4. 0830

Decyphered : 6.4. 1000

No. 19

of 5th April, 1942.

Addressed to TEHRAN No.43.

Rptd. Foreign Office No.19.
Bagdad No.19
/2 gps. omtd./

+ 1 change

I saw General Shahbakhti and the Governor-General today and confirmed the information received by me from P.A. last night that Shahbakhti favoured taking immediate steps to discover and examine the Kurds' grievances.

2. Shahbakhti recommends that the Governor-General who reside /2 gps. omtd./ Kurds should tour Western Kurdistan leaving here about April 9th, contact with dissident Kurds, discuss causes of revolt, and give formal undertaking /2 gps. omtd./ Iranian Government will remedy the Kurds' legitimate grievances. Shahbakhti states that he will give the Kurds safe conduct to Kermanshah in order to discuss their complaints here and adds that he favours setting up Anglo-Iranian Commission here to examine the grievances and make recommendations to Tehran. Shahbakhti stressed his desire to reach peaceful settlement.

+ 1 change

3. I undertook to report to you the above proposals and to enquire whether H.M. Government would agree to facilitate + settlement by granting safe conduct to the Kurds if necessary, and also by appointing British representatives upon the above mentioned Anglo-Iranian Commission. I added that such a course of action would be contrary to the non-intervention policy hitherto maintained by us, and that I could give no indication of H.M. Government's probable views regarding Tehran proposals.

4. Shahbakhti's changed attitude towards the Kurds problem is welcome, and as the proposals (with which the Governor General concurs) appear to offer hopes of leading to settlement they deserve favourable consideration. I should be grateful for instructions as to what reply should be given regarding the above proposals.

CW/JP
JB
RK

W.C. ✓ W.C.
The cables
What's for
Fletcher
I fed we have
running fit fit

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152
Iran: Kurds 152/66/42.

TELEGRAM.

How received.

From : H. M. MINISTER,
TEHRAN.

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

PARAP

Copies to :

Despatched : 4.4. 2020

Received : 5.4. 0800

Decyphered : 5.4. 1545

No. 90

of 4th April, 1942.

Kurdish chief from Ushnu has informed H.M. Consul at Tabriz that the Soviet forces recently occupied Khaneh frontier post on the Rowanduz road.

Can you confirm or deny?

I will enquire for
Col Lynn. W 6/4

NIGHT

V.L.

b. u

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152

Iran: Kurds

152 | 65 | 42.

No. --- SECRET

HIS Majesty's C O N S U L at KERMANSHAH
 presents his compliments to HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT BAGDAD
 and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents.

British.....Consulate.

.....Kermanshah.



26th March,....., 1942.

152
57
42

Reference to previous correspondence:

Kermanshah despatch No. 35 Secret of March 18th, 1942.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Kermanshah despatch No. 43 Secret of the 26th March, 1942.	General Shahbakhti and Kurdistan. He [initials] was not ready of date because see -166/- W 614

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3479 17268 (4)

British Consulate.

Kermanshah.

26th March 1942.

SIR,

With reference to my despatch No. 35 (Secret) of the 18th instant, describing a conversation I had with General Shahbakhti on the 17th March, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a letter sent to "G" Branch, H.Q., 10th Army by Colonel Fletcher, in which the latter puts forward his views regarding the present situation in Kurdistan and the need for arriving at a negotiated settlement.

2. Colonel Fletcher, you will see, now agrees with me that a negotiated settlement can and ought to be attempted, and that it would not be in our interests if the Iranian Military Authorities were left to their own devices in Kurdistan and "settled" the problem by a ruthless display of force unaccompanied by any constructive policy for the pacification of the Kurds.

3. In the light of Colonel Fletcher's remarks, I hope that you will concur in my view that it is of particular importance that immediate steps should be taken to restrain General Shahbakhti from taking military measures against the Kurds until the Iranian Government has re-considered its policy - if it has one - for settling the Kurdish problem. While there is yet time, the Iranian Government should make plans for negotiating a settlement which will hold out some promise of restoring lasting peace to Kurdistan.

4. It is clear that General Shahbakhti will not listen to counsels of moderation from anybody here; it is not even certain by any means that he would accept unquestioningly orders which he might receive from the Central Authorities in Tehran. As the Ustadar is a weak character and has little authority here, he could not influence General Shahbakhti even if he were minded to do so. Everybody here is in too great awe of General Shahbakhti to ~~argue~~ argue or remonstrate with him, and he has arrogated to himself much of the authority which ought to be exercised by the Civil Authorities. It is thus not inconceivable that he might decide to take action in Kurdistan without reference to Tehran.

5. It is known that General Shahbakhti has no faith in a negotiated settlement; he, moreover, is unlikely to hold his hand out of deference to British wishes - indeed his anti-British attitude might impel him to take the very action which we regarded as undesirable. In view of the foregoing observations, independent action by General Shahbakhti should not be ruled out as beyond the bounds of possibility. If such action were taken, the situation here might suddenly become dangerous to our lines of communication. Immediate and energetic action on the part of the Iranian Government seems, therefore, urgently necessary.

6. Copies of this despatch have been sent for information, to H.M.'s Ambassador at Bagdad, to the G.O.C. 6th Indian Division and to the Political Adviser at Kermanshah.

I have the honour to be

SIR,

With great respect,
Your most obedient
humble servant,

(Signed) J.R. Vaughan-Russell.

H.B.M. Consul.

Sir Reader Bullard K.C.M.G. C.I.E.,
British Legation,
Tehran.

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Iran: Kurds

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SAVINGRAM.

From: H.M. Minister, TEHRAN.

No.: 375

To: FOREIGN OFFICE.

Date: 26th March 1942.



Addressed to Foreign Office, . . . No. 375,
repeated to India, " 166,
" to Baghdad, SAVING " 41,
" to MINSTATE Cairo " 14,
" to Kermanshah " 9.

KERMANSHAH SITUATION REPORT No.27.

*HE 1. a.
Mr 6/4*

I have repeatedly urged Prime Minister to make some statement of policy in regard to the tribal areas and on March 15th I gave him list of points which I suggested might be embodied in such a declaration. He now informs me that declaration based mainly on these points will be made by him in reply to a question in the Majlis March 29th and he assures me that no hostilities will be undertaken until the declaration has been published and has had time to take effect. I hope that publication will be accompanied by one or two practical steps such as return of tribal lands seized by the Government and not sold to third parties and I have warned Prime Minister that without such step declaration will not be believed by the tribes.

2. Oriental Secretary will visit KURDISTAN area next week. (See your telegram No.247).

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BULLARD.

Iran: Kurds. 152/63/42

(152/63/42)

1st April, 1942.

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Dear General

Thank you for your letter No. D.O. 160/G of March 25th concerning Hama Reshid Khan.

2. The Iraqi Government have already undertaken to arrest this man if he is driven into Iraq (see their Note No. 13/13/4/1165 of 9th February, of which a copy was sent to you on 20th February) and I am quite willing to hold them to this undertaking if General Shahbakti succeeds in driving him out of Persia. I had not heard that he is in the habit of visiting his home in Iraq. Have you any reason to believe that this is the case?

Yours truly

(Sd.) Kinahan Cornwallis

h
h

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL E.P. QUINAN. C.B.,

V.H./KC

RK

RK

D.S.O., C.B.E.

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Reference 152/62/42

H.E. ✓ M. 3

W.M. 24

Amman

The Army Commander writes as though Hama Rashid had already been ~~down~~ into Iraq but Colonel Fletcher's report only refers to Shahbakti's request that Hama Rashid should be arrested if ~~he is accused from Russia~~.

I have drafted a reply for Your Excellency.

W.H.
30th March, 1942.

Wt. 50839/1245
2,500,000 4/40
D.P.W. 51-6580
(REGIMENT)
CODE 5-34-0

[OVER]

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Iran: Kurds 152/62/42.

S E C R E T.

No. D.O. 160/G.
 General Staff Branch,
 Headquarters Tenth Army.
 25 Mar '42.



Dear Sir Kinahan

The following is a copy of an extract from a report I have just received from the Commander 6 Ind Div. at KERMANSHAH on 22 Mar '42. It seems that the firebrand MOHD RASHID is able to enter and leave his property in IRAQ without hindrance. I should be grateful if his arrest in Iraq could be effected at an early date.

"I asked about KURDISTAN. Shahbakti's first remark in regard to this was illuminating. He said; "They wish to make KURDISTAN a garden of roses." I presume that he was tilting at the efforts to get a political policy of pacifying the KURDS laid down as a basis for all action. He stated that he had no intention of advancing into the SAKIZ area at present, there being no enemy force to tackle. He stated that SAKIZ was deserted owing to air bombing. He was insistent that MOHD RASHID could be easily dealt with if Iraq would co-operate by preventing him from escaping free to his lands there if he (SD) drove him up against the frontier. He was somewhat bitter about the lack of co-operation from the IRAQIS. It was most noticeable to me that this time he blamed the IRAQIS for their own non-co-operation. In previous interviews he has pressed for our co-operation and insisted that, as we controlled IRAQ it was for us and not the IRAQIS themselves to arrange it. He now seemed to think naturally of the IRAQIS as being responsible for their own policy vis-a-vis PERSIA whereas previously he thought naturally that we were responsible."

Archives
 Please send
 me with
 much & good
 care
 27/3

Yours sincerely
 Stevens.
 27/3

H.E. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, K.C.G.M., C.B.E., D.S.O.,
 His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador,
 BAGHDAD.

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Iran: Kurds. 152/61/42

COPIES TO COL. KYNTHIAN LEL. CUPS 26/3/42
" " B.G.S. KARAK WITH :
No. 16. " EDMOND X " : British Embassy,
(152/61/42) Bagdad.

26th March 1942.

Dear Sir,

Sir,

152/59/42
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Lyon, the Political Adviser of the Northern Area, which contains some interesting comments on the situation in Persian Kurdistan as seen from this side of the frontier.

I enclose a spare copy in case you should wish to send one to His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sd.) Kinahan Cornwallis

MS
Sir Reader W. Bullard, K.C.M.G., C.I.E.,

His Majesty's Minister,

TEHRAN.

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Iran: Kurds

152/60/42

(152/60/42)

British Embassy,
Bagdad.

26th March, 1942.

Dear Lyon.

Reference my 152/55/42 of March 19th.

His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah telegraphs that the Persian General Officer Commanding has not yet decided what course of action to take. Weather conditions will soon permit a resumption of military operations and General Shahbakhshi may order a move against the Kurds, though His Majesty's Consul has drawn his attention to the advantage of securing a settlement by negotiation.

cf tel. from

Yours sincerely.

Kermanshah No. 16 (F. 59/508)

W. A. Lyon

26.3.42.

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~~SECRET~~

152/59/42

No. 31/1054.

POLITICAL ADVISER'S OFFICE,
NORTHERN AREA.



Kirkuk, 22nd March, 1942.

Deer Sir Kukuk

63.

My Sir R.
Buland ^{W.K.}
Conj ^{despatch}

When he called here on March 3rd, Brigadier Boucher, among other things asked me about the situation in Persian Kurdistan. I said: (1) that there was no weakening of the Kurds towards compromise with the Persian Government. On the contrary the recent successes of Hama Rashid Khan had put all their tails up and that unless the Kurds realized we definitely disapproved it was unlikely that the Persians would regain control without considerable fighting. (2) That the Persian Kurds had been universally friendly towards us and preferred us to the Russians but had not received any encouragement. (3) That the Russians had made much of the Kurds and were quietly though effectively increasing their influence in that part of the country. (4) That I could see no signs of the Persians trying to reach a friendly compromise on the lines suggested last October and that I thought General Shahbakhti would do his best to get us embroiled with the Kurds through our garrison at Senna.

He said the Kermanshan road had not been interfered with since there had been a garrison in Senna. I said I thought this was a mere coincidence as Senna being 60 miles away was all the same as if it were 160 to the people interfering with the road who, in any case, were not the people around Senna.

He asked my opinion about what the political effect would be if the Senna Garrison withdrew. I said that it would remove the danger of getting embroiled in the Persian Kurdish struggle; that the Kurds would probably take Senna, but that it would be unlikely to effect the Kermanshan-Khanaqin road, which was in the vicinity of the Kalkhani, Sinjabi and Kalhor tribesmen. As an intermediate step possibly Qasir Shirin might do. I said I would enquire more about it from people who ought to know and let him know later.

Since then I have had an opportunity to discuss frontier affairs with such people as the Qaimmaqam of Khanaqin, Karim Beg Jaf, Karim Beg Ja'far Sultan (of Nawsud and Persian tribal Agent for Auroman) and the Mutasarrif of Sulaimani who is a native of Khanaqin.

The Kurdish feeling about the Persians is as hard as ever, even their own tribal agents are unhappy and undependable. Hama Rashid Khan has been flourishing and has reached a stage where he can call on considerable numbers of tribesmen to his support when necessary. Zain al-Abidin (an old associate of Sayid Taha, now Katib Tahrir of Chemchemal) told me yesterday that Pusho had returned from Baku with about 23 Kurdish chiefs after being entertained by the Russians: that with the support of Qarani Agha and the Qadhi of Sauj Bulak he was going to set up under Russian support: that Sayid Tabas followers including Sayid Muslin, Sayid Abdullan and Simko's son with the Shikak had all joined him: that he was in touch with Hama Rashid Khan and that he wanted to know the British attitude. I gave a verbal reply that as we had

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made a treaty with Persia we were bound by it and could not support his activities and presumably the Russians were bound in the same way, though whether they kept their word or not was their own affair. We did not want to do anything that would be considered unneighbourly by Turkey either.

How much of this is true or wishful thinking I am at present unable to say but it all looks like Russian encouragement if not the seed of a Kurdish Soviet.

Karim Beg I Ja'far Sultan, though nominally a Persian Agent, hates and distrusts the Persians no less than his father. Mahmud Khan of Kanisonan, their Merivan Agent, is much the same, though from a letter I saw he appears to look towards Shaikh Mahmud.

The Pizhder do not seem to have entered into the picture as yet but are still principally concerned with land grabbing feuds with the Mangur.

The Mutasarrif of Sulaimani and the Qaimmaqam of Khanaqin confirm the views I expressed to Brigadier Boucher, and Karim Beg Jaf thinks he could, if necessary, influence most of the Persian Kurds from Iraq. The Mutasarrif has exiled Shaikh Muhammad Sa'id for intriguing with Mahmud Khan Kanisonan (Merivan).

The Persians after re-establishing most of their posts on the Khanaqin side and settled with the Kalkhani Chiefs (all except Mama Hama) have now suddenly withdrawn the garrisons of the frontier posts and the Qaimmaqam of Khanaqin believes that the Walad Begi Baba-zari, Kalbor and Kalkhani tribesmen have decided to resist the Persian Government.

I send a second copy in case you wish to send one to Brigadier Boucher.

*Yours sincerely
Adyam*

Sir K. Cornwallis, K.C.M.G., D.S.O.,
H.B.M's Ambassador,
British Embassy,
Baghdad.

Iran: Kurds 152/58/42.

Copy: The Chancery, British Embassy, Baghdad No. 14 (144/69/42)
With the compliments of H.M. Minister. of 16th March, 1942.

No. 81
(144/69/42)

16th March, 1942.



Sir,

Consul

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from Tabriz, No. 6 of the 26th February, in which His Majesty's gives a translation from the Azerbaijan Turkish dialect of the "Programme and Desires of the Azerbaijan Workers' Committee". The mere comprehensiveness of the programme establishes, as Mr. Cock suggests, a foreign origin, and there are many touches which point straight to Soviet Russia, e.g. the demands for the protection of the vernacular theatre, for the absorption into productive factory work of the inmates of brothels, and for the equality of women with men in social and political affairs - all matters remote from the views of the oriental and the Moslem. I mentioned this programme to my Soviet colleague as the kind of thing that did us great harm in adding to the suspicion of the Turkish Government that Soviet Russia had designs on Azerbaijan. Monsieur Smirnov not only denied that there could be any Soviet influence at work here, but so far forgot his excellent sense of humour as to suggest that an enemy had done this: there were, he said, many signs of "provocation" in Azerbaijan.

2. It is possible that the Soviet authorities, having been obliged to retreat somewhat in their encouragement of the Kurds and other minorities and to be more accommodating in the matter of the installation of adequate numbers of Persian police and gendarmes in Azerbaijan, are turning more attention to political parties. It seemed to me that Monsieur Smirnov took a keener interest in the recent cabinet crisis than he had ever taken in Tehran politics before. He spoke to me strongly in favour of Qawam al Saltana as a possible premier, and from the Qawam we learn that Monsieur Smirnov sent for him and made much of him; and now we have this programme of political and social demands which, for all that it is more discreet than inviting Kurdish leaders to visit Baku and refusing to allow the Persian Government to keep adequate numbers of police at Rezaieh, has yet a separatist tendency which can only help to confirm the suspicion with which Soviet policy in Azerbaijan is regarded by the Persian and Turkish Governments.

3. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz, and copies with copies of the enclosures to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department and to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo and Kuibyshev.

I have the honour to be with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,

(Signed) R.W. MILLARD.

The Right Honourable
Anthony Eden, P.C., M.C., M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Foreign Office,
LONDON.

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2000.

BRITISH LEGATION,

TABRIZ.

No. 6.

February 26th, 1942.

SIR,

With reference to paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 5 of the 20th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the programme (printed in Turkish dialect in the form of a booklet) of the chief of the new clubs in Tabriz.

2. The Soviet authorities firmly deny that they have anything to do with the matter, but the Iranians say that they know that the chief members of the club or committee continually visit the Soviet military offices and are in close touch with the Soviet-Azerbaijan journalist Ahdieroglu, who is supposed to have had the booklet printed here in the press which prints the Soviet army's newspaper "Vatan Yolculu" for the Caucasian troops in Turkish dialect. They say that the ordinary local printers do not know how to set up type in the dialect, and only print in Persian. It is difficult for the Iranians also to believe that among the local down-trodden and politically-undeveloped proletariat there has suddenly sprung up a body of leaders capable of compiling unaided such an ambitious, all-embracing albeit mostly half-baked programme.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient,

Humble Servant,

(Signed, F.A.C. GOL.

In Majesty's Minister,
British Legation,
Tehran.

The Programme and Desires of the Azerbaijan Workers Committee.

1. To fight energetically against despotism, dictatorship and fascism, and to establish complete liberty: of the nation, of association, of the individual, of language, and of the press.
2. To form (in accordance with the constitutional law of Iran) unions in town and country by the free association of the workers, and to increase their power like a national parliament.
3. To spread and teach the idea of democratic freedom in every part of the country and to every person among the workers.
4. To form workers' unions to improve the material and moral welfare of workers and servants, and to make known these aims officially to the Government authorities.
5. To remove unemployment, and to form unemployment-exchanges to gain exact statistics of the unemployed.
6. To arrange long-term loans to the peasants through the Agricultural Bank.
7. To take advantage of the increase of purchasing-power by having local industries enlarged.
8. To abolish internal concessions in order to increase the output and capacity of internal industries, and so create more competition and freedom in industry.
9. To establish committees for securing the vital needs of the workers and utilising their labour, consumption, production and village properties.
10. To amend the Customs tariffs on imported luxury goods and home-produced goods, and impose heavy taxes on unnecessary wares in order to protect home industries and combat unemployment.
11. To protect the education of the minorities (language, writing, theatre, press) and respect their nationality.
12. To have judicial proceedings in Azerbaijan carried on in the Azerbaijani language, to have a High Court established in Azerbaijan, and have all laws and codes translated into the said language in order to avoid difficulties for the workers who are not acquainted with the Persian language.
13. To establish medical, agricultural, law- and teachers' training schools in Azerbaijan.
14. To see that all teaching and medical treatment are general and free.
15. To review the laws and social laws in order to protect the welfare of the workers.
16. To reduce all indirect taxes in a just manner.
17. To re-organise transport and communications in order to benefit economic and commercial work and to reform industries, mines, railways, roads and shipping.
18. The ex-Shah's properties and possessions to be confiscated and a due portion (assessed according to the population of Azerbaijan as part of all Iran) to be set aside and spent for social improvement in Azerbaijan.

19. To see that the whole of Government revenues in Azerbaijan are spent on its needs.
20. To oppose illegalities in Government departments and among authorities and officials, especially the Police and Gendarmerie who ill-treat lovers of freedom, and to oppose the bad advantages taken of the law.
21. To establish close relations with the other workers' associations formed in other parts of Iran, and to help them when necessary.
22. To recognise the equality of women in political and social affairs.
23. To establish clubs and theatres for the political and social education of the workers and to publish various papers.
24. To abolish the laws passed against the freedom of the people during the time of the ex-Shah Pahlevi.

Methods of the Azerbaijan Workers' Committee.

1. Unions must be formed in town and country of all parties of the nation, and their powers must be those of a local Parliament.
2. Strong opposition must be offered to despotism and fascism, and their secret activities must be revealed to the people.
3. Immediate help must be given to small business-men and unemployed workers as follows:

Textile, cloth, carpet, leather, shoe-making and other manual trades must be put under the control of agricultural and industrial banks, the capital of which must not be less than 10 million rials.
To guarantee the collection of the above sum, 2 million rials must be deposited with the Bank from the sum sent in the name of the Shah.
Cinemas must be established in the Municipality and other named places, the profits to be controlled by the committee and devoted to the poor and the sick, and for collecting beggars from the streets.
Monies collected by the Customs, Finance and other local commissions must be spent under the control of the committee.
In order to prevent hoarding, monopolised goods must be sold not to wholesale merchants, but direct to retailers and co-operative stores etc.
4. Immediate facilities must be granted for the teaching and spread of the Azerbaijan language in Azerbaijan as follows:

Text-books must be translated into Azerbaijani before the commencement of the school-year 1321.
All stories and phrases in favour of despotism must be deleted from school-books, and stories of Azerbaijan freedom inserted instead.
The Persian language will be studied in schools after the 4th class.

5. Criminal law and other law will be translated into the Azerbaijan language.
6. Judgments beginning with preliminary investigation and up to the high Court will be in the Azerbaijani language, and a High Court will be established immediately in Azerbaijan.
7. Houses of ill-fame, which are a relic of despotism, must be entirely closed and prevented from opening, and the inmates given first acceptance in the productive factories.
8. Authorities guilty of criminal practices during the reign of Pahlevi must be held responsible and brought to proper trial.
9. Rich men who are drawing large salaries in government offices must be replaced by capable unemployed.
10. Corrupt bribe-takers in government departments must be fought against without exception, and heavy punishments inflicted on them.
11. In order to ensure the fair distribution of goods which are now becoming scarce, and to see that they reach the people without bribery, representatives and controllers from the Workers' Committee must be included on the various commissions.

SECRET.

No.

Copied from 26/3/41 C.G.C. +
" " " " " " Lyon' +

HIS Majesty's Consul *Levi* at Kermanshah presents his compliments to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents.

British.....Consulate.....

.....Kermanshah.....

.....Iran.....

18March....., 1924.

Reference to previous correspondence:



Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Memorandum D/18/3/42	Situation in Kurdistan. RE View RE ^{24.3.} RE ^{24.3.} RE ^{24.3.} Org to Edol? 26MAR 1942 JH <u>Mr. Clark G. Hyatt</u> <u>What does he mean</u>

u

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SECRET.

Enclosure in Kermanshah despatch No. 35 dated March 18th. 1942.

Memorandum.

As it seemed desirable to re-establish contact with General Shahbakhti after his absence in Tehran, I saw him yesterday and, after enquiries concerning his medical treatment in Tehran and conversation on several minor matters, I asked whether he had any plans for dealing with the Kurdish problem, and what policy the Iranian Government proposed to adopt with a view to arriving at a settlement of the question.

2. To begin with, Shahbakhti seemed reluctant to discuss the matter and vaguely hinted that he hoped to visit Sanandaj in a week's time and would decide what steps required to be taken after he had satisfied himself regarding the present position in Kurdistan. He harped upon the responsibility of Hama Rashid and a small gang of brigands for prolonging the unrest in Kurdistan contrary to the wishes of the majority of the population, and enquired whether it would be possible to force the Kurdish leaders, whose lands lay astride the frontier, to become Iraqi subjects and to give up once and for all their lands on the Iranian side of the frontier. In this way they might be refused the right to enter Iran and the Iraqi Government would be forced to accept responsibility for maintaining these firebrands under control in Iraq.

3. I evaded this question and asked the General whether he really thought that Hama Rashid and the other leaders of the present revolt were carrying on a movement which had not the support of the majority of the Kurds. He replied that only 10% of the population supported the rebels and that the rest of the population either helped the rebels because they could not avoid doing so or entirely disapproved of the revolt against Iranian Government authority. This gave me the opening which I wanted and I then asked the General whether he was sure that 90% of the population disapproved of the rebels' efforts to obtain better conditions for Kurdistan and whether it was not true that most Kurds, for many years past, had had much to complain of with regard to the officials which the Iranian Government had maintained in Kurdistan. Had they not a number of grievances and were they not to some extent justified in protesting against the failure of the Iranian Government to enquire into their complaints and to make serious attempts to remedy at least some of them?

4. Shahbakhti was not prepared to admit, frankly, that the Kurds had had in the past any grounds for complaint; at the same time he evidently realized that I thought that the Kurds had a number of grievances which required to be examined by the Iranian Authorities. He criticized the Kurds' inability to govern themselves and seemed to imply that this absolved the Iranian Government from the need for providing efficient and honest officials for Kurdistan. He then asked me if I knew what the Kurds were dissatisfied about, and if so, whether I had any views as to the best way of remedying the causes of the Kurds' dissatisfaction. I replied that I had not met any Kurdish notables or any leaders of the present revolt; I had paid two 24-hour visits to Uenna since I arrived in Iran nearly six years ago so I could hardly pretend to know a great deal about the Kurds or their grievances. In any case, I said, I had instructions from the British Legation to maintain a detached attitude towards all Kurdish rebels and to do all in my power to support the Iranian Authorities in their efforts to restore order and their authority in Kurdistan. At the same time I knew that the British Government hoped that the Iranian Authorities would redress the Kurds' legitimate grievances. In view of the foregoing, any observations which I made to him were purely my own and did not represent the views of the British Legation or of His Majesty's Government.

5. From conversations which I had with a number of Iranians of various categories, I had gained the impression that most of the Kurds felt that they had been badly governed for many years past and that they were anxious that in future, the officials serving in Kurdistan should be honest, efficient and, above all, be chosen as far as possible from among the Kurds themselves. They wanted to be governed by persons of their own race and religion; they objected to taxes being collected in Kurdistan and the money thus collected being spent on officials who were inefficient and dishonest or spent outside Kurdistan on projects which did not benefit the Kurds or their province e.g. on beautifying Tehran. They objected to conscription which, because they were poor, they could not evade by the payment of bribes, as happened in the case of richer Iranians. They felt that the Iranian Government neglected their province and that there were fewer schools and less medical facilities per head of the population than in most other provinces.

6. If there was any truth in the above reports describing the Kurds' grievances, the reasons for the present trouble in Kurdistan were obvious, for they explained it. Assuming that these reports were true, it seemed to me that the Iranian Government could restore peace among the Kurds by the simple process of redressing most of the grievances. The Iranian Army could, of course, if it seriously set out to crush the Kurds, succeed in doing so within a few months, but I considered that it would be a mistake to deal harshly with the Kurds (who after all, had some cause for complaint), for by doing so the Iranian Government would create among the Kurds a strong spirit of revenge and within one or two years, they would very likely seize the first favourable opportunity for attacking the Iranian troops sent to garrison Kurdistan. A long-term, far-sighted policy was best, I thought, for if the Kurds could be made to feel confident that the Iranian Government really intended to make radical changes in the administration of Kurdistan, there seemed to me no reason why they should not cease their opposition, and why they should not respect and obey the Iranian Government's representatives throughout the whole province.

7. I thought therefore that the Kurds would cease resistance if the following reforms were introduced:-

- (a) The employment of more Kurds in the Administration, (Police, Armies and other Government Departments, as far as possible
- (b) Cancellation of arrears of taxation; the poverty in Kurdistan made it useless to insist on attempting to collect taxes which it was obviously impossible for the persons concerned to pay.
- (c) Suspension of Conscription, ~~for one or two years~~ a most unpopular measure, for one or two years.
- (d) Improvements in the Public Health, Education and Agriculture (irrigation) services throughout the province.

8. I finally ventured to predict that, if the Kurds were given the better administration for which they were now clamouring, and if they were satisfied, their disarming would be an easy matter in one year's time for they would then respond to the Iranian Government's appeal to hand over any arms still in the possession of the tribal population.

9. I did not minimize the difficulties which would need to be ~~overcome~~^{surmounted}, but I ventured the personal opinion that it was worth while considering a settlement on the above lines. The Kurds knew that they would get neither encouragement nor help from His Majesty's Government. If they were given no chance of making known and of explaining their grievances there was, I said, the possibility that they might turn to the Russians for assistance. That might be a source of embarrassment and danger to the Iranian Government and it seemed to me advisable that the Iranian Authorities should try and make friends with the Kurds rather than make the enemies of them. I ended by emphasizing that the views

which I had put forward were purely personal and did not necessarily represent the views of the British Legation at Tehran or of the British Government.

10. General Shahbakhti, thanked me for having so frankly let him know what I thought about Kurdistan problem and said that he had already suggested to the newly-appointed Farmandar of Kurdistan (Seirullah Asif) that some reforms should be introduced in Kurdistan. The new Farmandar was, he said, a Kurd. As he was also a wealthy land-owner in Kurdistan, he had the interests of the province at heart and would be the last person to extort money from the Kurdish population. For that reason he thought that the position in Kurdistan would improve. He said that he intended himself to visit Kurdistan shortly and would discuss future plans for Kurdistan with the new Farmandar.

11. I did not press General Shahbakhti to state whether he proposed to continue military operations against the Kurds. It is reported that he wishes to re-occupy Sakkis and to re-establish a garrison there, and it is probable, therefore, that he will feel it necessary to drive the Kurds out of Sakkis in order to re-assert his position and to restore the Army's lowered prestige. It is difficult to foresee whether he will hold his hand and attempt a peaceful settlement of the problem or whether he will adopt immediate military measures to re-occupy Sakkis and thereby risk the inevitable and possibly serious consequences which must result from a clash with the Kurds in the Sakkis district.

12. I have spoken to both the Ustandar and the Farmandar of Kermanshah regarding the Kurdistan problem in terms similar to those used by me to General Shahbakhti and I know that the above officials fully realize the need for arriving at a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish imbroglio. The Ustandar and Farmandar tell me that they intend visiting Tehran before the end of March and discussing the Kurdish problem with the members of the Iranian Cabinet. They wish to obtain instructions for dealing with this delicate problem and it is to be hoped that they will receive orders to attempt a negotiated settlement without delay. Should General Shahbakhti "get in first" and military operations be recommenced the success of attempts which may be made later on to secure a settlement by negotiations may be seriously prejudiced.

(Sgd) J. A. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL

H. M. Consul.

British Consulate,
Kermanshah,
18th March, 1942.

H. M. Minister, Tehran (Despatch No. 35)

Copy to H. M. Ambassador, Bagdad

~~152~~ 152 | 56 | 42.

No. **Unnumbered**

SECRET

HIS Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah
presents his compliments to His Majesty's Representative at Bagdad
and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents.

British Consulate

Kermanshah.

15th March, 1942.

Reference to previous correspondence :

Description of Enclosure.



Name and Date.	Subject.
<p>Secret Memorandum dated March 15th 1942 by H.M.'s Consul, Kermanshah.</p> <p><i>RE: 15/3</i></p> <p><i>AKR 15/3</i></p>	<p>Fears entertained by Abdulla Beker, Iraq Consul Kermanshah, regarding development of Communism in Iran and Iraq.</p> <p><i>Copy to C.I.A.</i></p> <p><i>Mr. Edwards Date 15/3</i></p>

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Addressed to Tehran
Copy to Bagdad.

British Consulate,
Kermanshah.
15th March, 1942.

S E C R E T

Memorandum.

When Abdulla BEKER, the Iraq Consul came to pay me a farewell visit on the 11th March, he referred to a conversation which he had had with an Iranian merchant who had just arrived here from Tabriz, concerning Soviet activities in that district. Abdulla Beker's informant had told him that the Russian Authorities had recently, on many occasions, issued orders to the wealthier merchants and landowners in Tabriz, demanding the payment of money to Iranians who were Russian sympathisers. The latter, he said, were recruited from the most disreputable and turbulent elements in the population and many of them had been granted Soviet passports or 'laissez-passer' and were being encouraged to defy the Iranian Authorities and to carry on Communist propaganda. This propaganda consisted largely in spreading reports of the Soviet Authorities' intention of benefiting the poorest Iranians at the expense of the rich land-owners and merchants. As proof of the Russians' determination to help the peasants and the poor the Russians, so the Tabrizi said, had made arbitrary levies on the rich and had paid monies thus collected to pro-Soviet Iranians; they had also encouraged peasants to refuse to hand over to their land-owners the shares of all produce which the landlords had received in the past. The Tabrizi finally added that the exactions of the Russians had now become so heavy and so frequent that he had left Tabriz and would not return until the Russians evacuated Iran.

2. In reply I said that I thought that most of the stories one heard about the Russians' activities in Iran were exaggerated and that the Tabrizi was probably an alarmist. Abdulla Beker agreed that many Iranians were only too ready to criticise the Russians; at the same time, however, he considered that his informant's report was based on facts and not mere hearsay. He added that he feared that, unless the Iranian Government took active and wise measures to counter the Russians' Communist propaganda, e.g. by reducing food prices, improving the system of land-tenure and the general living conditions of the peasantry, the poverty-stricken and discontented masses in Iran would rise against the Iranian Government; if this happened it was easy to foresee that the Soviet Govt. would find the whole country ripe for introducing Communism and even for setting up in Iran a Soviet Republic which would be politically united to the USSR.

3. He himself feared that the trend of events pointed to the early collapse of Iranian Govt. authority under pressure from the ill-governed, discontented masses and he feared also, not only that the weak and inefficient Iranian Administration would be unequal to the task of maintaining its authority but especially

especially that the Soviet Authorities might be tempted to aid & abet the forces of disorder, which might attempt to overthrow the Iranian Govt., in order to instal a Soviet regime in Iran. If, as he feared, Communism became established in Iran, the outlook for Iraq would be serious indeed. It was for this reason that he had raised the above question, upon which he felt very strongly; indeed, he considered that the only hope of avoiding the disasters which, he felt certain, lay ahead lay in energetic and prompt British intervention.

4. I strove to minimise the dangers which my Iraqi colleague had conjured up but he was firm in his belief that unpleasant & dangerous developments were likely to occur in Iran- and possibly Iraq- in the not very distant future. I pointed to the obvious difficulties which the Iranians had in governing themselves and that it was not surprising that the Russians should be appealed to by the discontented people in N. Iran for help in restoring order out of the chaos which they found on arriving there. At the same time I agreed that it might be to everybody's disadvantage if Communism gained too firm a hold upon Iran; I minimised the danger of that for, I said, the Russians would probably not stay in Iran long enough to leave a permanent and favourable impression upon the masses who, at heart, preferred Iranian to Russian task-masters. In one or two years, it seemed to me unlikely that the Russians could have the time to work up a strong feeling in favour of themselves among the majority of the population; by two years, however, it was to be expected that the war would be over and the Russians would withdraw their troops and officials from Iran. It was to be hoped that Communism would not have had time by then to take too deep a root in Iran.

5. As I have very little definite information regarding the Soviet Authorities' present activities in Iran I cannot judge how far the Soviet Government is loyally supporting the Iranian Govt. or whether it may, in fact, be carrying on propaganda which is at variance with the policy of co-operation which it outwardly professes to be adopting in Iran. It is difficult, therefore to express an opinion as to whether Abdulla Beker's fears are groundless or not. I should add that, so far, I have received no reliable reports showing that the Russian Authorities have started to carry on subversive activities or Communist propaganda here; the recent re-opening of the Russian Consulate here with a suspiciously large staff may herald the launching of a 'propaganda drive' but on the other hand it may mean nothing of importance. In view, however, of the persistent, if unconfirmed rumours of Russian efforts to popularise Communism in N. Iran, the opening of an apparently unnecessary Consulate here is I think, a disquieting development. (Sd.) J.R. Vaughan-Russell
H.M. Consul.

From: Kermanshah. 152/55/42

(152/55/42)

British Embassy,
Bagdad.

19th March, 1942.

Rec'd from

1. The Consul at Kermanshah reports that the Persian General Officer Commanding returned to Kermanshah on March 12th from Tehran where he is assumed to have discussed the Kurdish question. It is not known what decisions were reached.

2. The Governor-General has stated that he too will visit Tehran about the end of March to discuss the best methods of restoring peace in Kurdistan without recourse to military intervention. He has expressed the view that to crush the Kurds would be only a temporary and wholly unsatisfactory solution of the problem and that it ought to be possible to put an end to the Kurdish troubles by making some concessions to the Kurds and by redressing many of their grievances.

MS. L. 1. 1. 1

SEE TEL. NO. 16 INDEX
from Kermanshah
F. 59/543

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W.A. LYON, O.B.E.

VH
RR
VH

152
v52
Iran - Kurds

152 | 54 | 42

SAVINGRAM.

From: H.M. Minister, TEHRAN.
No.: 294

To: FOREIGN OFFICE.

Date: 6th March 1942.

Addressed to F.O.,... No.294,
Repeated to India,... " 150,
" to Ankara, " 39.

KUIBYEHEFF SAVING No. 12,
BAGHDAD, " " 35,
MINSTATE CAIRO, " 8.

Following received from TABRIZ; tel. No.30 of March 2nd,

BEGINS: Local situation has lately deteriorated owing to continued armed burglaries and authority-flouting attitude of certain Committee Leaders. KURDS are again walking about the streets armed. Chief of police seems willing to take firmer action although he realizes his police are too weak or inefficient to cope fully but the Governor-General said to be temporizing. Meanwhile residents nervous and preparations for flight increasing. There are bitter complaints against British Consul for allowing situation to become so bad!

2. I have had long conversation with Soviet Consult-General and decided that Russian co-operation in assuring order may be necessary, but I begin to think that Iranian authorities do not want any such collaboration, - at least until situation gets even worse. Perhaps they wish to force the return of Iranian troops here, but my Soviet colleague imputes more sinister motives consonant with enemy plans for disorder.

3. My chief fear is that leading officials may clear out to TEHRAN, when it would be very difficult to replace them, so badly is AZERBAIJAN pictured in the capital.

4. Unemployment and business stagnation are partly responsible for present position together with lack of confidence in the Government's ability or even sympathy. ENDS.

17/3
Hof
W

BULLARD.



17/3

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Iran: Kurds.

152/53/42

(152/53/42)

British Embassy,
Bagdad.

SECRET.

11th March, 1942.

Dear Lyon,

152/51/42 Your letter No. C/11/953 of the 3rd March.

You will perhaps be interested to know that Sir Reader Bullard proposes to send the Oriental Secretary from the Legation at Tehran to visit various places in Persian Kurdistan to study the situation. He will do his best not to inspire the Kurds with baseless hopes or the Iranians with suspicions.

2. Sir Reader reports that the danger from Soviet encouragement of the Kurds in the North seems to have diminished at least for the present. The Soviet authorities in Persia are now assisting rather than hindering the Persian authorities in restoring order.

3. As you know, Holman is going to Tehran as Counsellor in a few days. He is fully aware of all the implications of the Kurdish situation and will, I am sure, be of the greatest assistance to us.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) V.HOLT.

LIEUT. COLONEL W.A. LYON O.B.E.

VH/KC

MR

PK

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Iran: Kurds

152/52/42.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
IRAQ.

Baghdad the 7th March 1942

P.S. No. 289.



Edward H. Holt

العراق

الناظمة الالكترونية

بغداد

My dear Doctor,

152
51
42

Reference Lyon's C/11/953 of 3.3.42.

Could I have copies of your 152/44/42 and

152/39/42 referred to ?

Very
Sincerely
Edward H. Holt

*Very sincerely,
Edward H. Holt*

Captain V. Holt, CMG. MVO.

Archives

18 MAR 1942

*Archives and Library
Mr. Edwards M.A.
18 MAR 1942
INDEX
152/52/42*



No. C/11/953.
POLITICAL ADVISER'S OFFICE,
NORTHERN AREA.

Kirkuk, 3rd March, 1942.

Dear Holt Calverley

Reference your 152/44/42. I have spoken to Ja'far Sultan and also to Karim Beg his son who is the Persian Government Agent for the Lohun tribal area and conveyed H.E's message. Both of them assure me that there is no truth in the allegation. Furthermore Karim Beg being the officially recognized agent has stated that were there any truth in the allegation the Persian Government would not be slow in holding him responsible for his brother's acts.

I enclose a letter from Mamud Khan Kanisonan, the officially recognized Persian Agent for Merivan which after about two months seems to have reached me through the A.L.O. Sulaimani. It is a sorry tale of woe from a person who is supposed to be the fair haired boy of the Persian Government and the mention of Shaikh Mamud in this or in some other seized letter as a possible leader for the Kurds in Persia is probably responsible for the arrest of Shaikh Ahmad (Konaposni) by the Administrative authorities in Sulaimani. I have not replied.

Referring to the enclosure to your 152/39/42 of 19th February, I am of course unacquainted with the true facts, but I cannot help feeling that Shan Baktis version seems to be invariably accepted without question whereas no Kurdish version seems to be ever brought to light, nor have I heard of any sincere effort to ascertain facts and effect a settlement on the lines proposed last October.

As I see things, apart from the activities of the robber Baron Hama Rashid Khan the Kurds are definitely groping for self determination and friendly to the British cause and hostile to the Persian Government with whom we have just completed a treaty for the duration of the war. I presume the Persians would never have signed such a treaty had not the British and Russian forces occupied the country. On the other hand this occupation has given the Kurds the chance for which they had waited so long and rightly or wrongly they regard the British as liberators and nothing we can say will make them believe otherwise.

As things are, further fighting may be expected between our treaty and non treaty friends and as like as not one side or the other will eventually fall into line with the Axis, thereby adding to our enemies. What happens in Persian Kurdistan is no direct concern of mine but as this is unlikely to stop on the frontier I feel justified in suggesting that some further effort be made through the British Authorities to arrive at a democratic unbiased and peaceful settlement.

Capt: V. Holt, C.M.G., C.V.O.,
Oriental Secretary,
British Embassy,
Baghdad.

Copy to:

: C.J. Edmonds Esq., C.M.G.

INDEX

Yours sincerely
Allison

Iran-Kurds 152/50/42 ~~URGENT~~

SECRET.

No. G/330,
Gen Staff Branch,
H.Q., Tenth Army,
19 Feb 42.



H.B.M's Ambassador,

Subject:- MOHD RASHID.

The following extract from an appreciation of the KURDISH situation in PERSIA by Major General THOMSON, Comd 6 Ind Div is forwarded for your information.

" A real effort should be made to bring pressure to bear on MOHD RASHID from IRAQ. "

MOHD RASHID appears to have been in Command of the KURDISH hostiles who recently attacked SAKKIZ.

~~Mr. Cawley~~ 2/2
Please see 152/39/42
BR. No. 9. 1/12/42

Lieut-General, Commander.

1/12/42

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How received :

PARAP.

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Copy as
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JL/RD
RK
RKIran: Kurds 152/49/42
TELEGRAM.

From : FOREIGN OFFICE, To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,

LONDON. BAGDAD.

Copies to : GOC

Despatched : 19.2.42 (0810)

AOC

Received : 20.2.42 (1245)

CIC

Decyphered : 20.2.42 (1845)

No. 203 of 18.2.42

rptd to Addressed to TEHRAN TEL. 256,

Kuibishev No. 253,
Angora No. 295,
Bagdad No. 203,
Cairo No. 25/Saving.
India Saving.

My telegram No. 116.

Following is summary of Soviet Ambassador's note dated February 12th conveying his government's reply.

The Soviet Government consider that His Majesty's Government's information from Tehran and Angora about events in Iran, Azerbaijan and Northern Kurdistan is false, inaccurate and exaggerated. The Soviet Government are naturally interested in maintaining public order and security particularly in the regions where Soviet forces are stationed. They consider, however, that order should be maintained by the Iranian Government themselves. The Soviet authorities are fully prepared to assist and are actually assisting the Iranian authorities to take the necessary measures. The Soviet Government have never objected to the numbers of Iranian police and gendarmerie being increased when necessary and when the Iranian Government have requested this to be done. Instructions to consider favourably the Iranian Government's wishes in this respect were sent to the Soviet Ambassador at Tehran early in January. They had also agreed as soon as the Iranian Government approached them, that the required numbers of Iranian troops should be sent to Azerbaijan and Khorassan to deal with the bandits and to restore order. Soviet troops in these provinces were also instructed to assist the local Iranian authorities in restoring order.

The Soviet Ambassador at Tehran had also, on instructions, twice called the attention of the Iranian Government to the need for urgent measures to combat the rebels and had offered to give the Iranian Government any help they required to re-establish order. The Iranian Prime Minister had expressed his thanks for the assistance given by the Soviet Government.

Any information differing from these facts should not be considered reliable and may be the work of Hitlerite agents who are trying, especially in the disturbed districts, to spread provocative rumours e.g. that some of the rebel leaders in Khorassan are English agents. It is the task of the Iranian authorities with the help of the Soviet authorities on the spot to dispel all such rumours whose only aim is to stir up trouble amongst the population.

The

The Note maintains that the events in Northern Kurdistan were a sequel to troubles in the southern part of the province while the situation in Rezaieh was caused by the provocative attitude of the Governor who was spreading false rumours and trying to stir up trouble between the Arabic nationalities. After the Governor had been dismissed by the Iranian Government and had left Rezaieh, the situation returned to normal and the Soviet forces stationed there helped considerably in effecting this. In this case also the Soviet Government agreed to despatch as many gendarmerie and police as the Iranian Government wished to send to Rezaieh.

2. I asked the Soviet Ambassador when he left this note with me on February 12th to thank his Government for their full reply and to tell them that my latest information confirmed that the situation had been exaggerated by the Iranian authorities. The Ambassador said that he felt sure that this was so and hoped we would not be too ready to believe Iranian and Turkish complaints about Soviet behaviour. They were, after all, prejudiced parties in these matters. I said that it was not a question of believing these reports but that when I received such information I thought it only the part of an ally to pass it on. I should certainly expect the Soviet Government to do the same.

THE Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to His Majesty's Representative at Bagdad and transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

31st, January, 1942

Reference to previous correspondence:



Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Copy of letter to Sir R. Bullard, Tehran, No. 12, of Jan. 30th, 1942	Recent developments in Persian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.
Copy of letter to Monsieur Marshy from Mr. Baccia of Jan. 17th, 1942	
Copy of letter to Monsieur Marshy from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Jan 21st, 1942	
Copy of memorandum communicated to Monsieur Stalin by the Secretary of State on Dec. 20th., 1941.	
Copy of letter to the Secretary of State from Monsieur Marshy of Jan 1st. 1942., enclosing a memorandum.	<p>MS ✓ Jan 22/2 Cables Jan 22/2 Information H.O. Cables 22/2 V.A. 22/2</p>

A similar despatch has been addressed to H.M. Representative Consular Officer at Angora Bairu Turkeyshe

No. 12.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(E 585/21/34)

30th January, 1942.

Sir,

152 }
18 }
42 } With reference to my telegram 116 of the
21st January and previous correspondence regarding
recent developments in Persian Azerbaijan and
Kurdistan, I transmit herewith copies of an aide
mémoire handed to M. Stalin on the 20th December
last, of a note from the Soviet Ambassador
transmitting his government's reply, and of my two
notes to M. Maisky of the 17th January and the 21st
January.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to
His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo, Angora,
Kuibyshev and Bagdad.

I am, with great truth and regard,
Sir,

Your obedient Servant,
(For the Secretary of State)

(Sd.) C. W. Baseler

Sir Reader Bullard, K.C.M.G., C.I.E.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Tehran.

TURKISH ANXIETY ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN KURDISTAN.

On December 2nd Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs communicated an Aide-Memoire to H. H. Embassy complaining that the Kurds were aiming at establishing an independent Kurdish state, that they were being encouraged by the occupying forces in Persia, and that they were raiding into Turkish territory.

On December 5th the Turkish Secretary-General spoke very earnestly about this subject and said that the Turkish Government might have to send troops to the Turkish side of the frontier.

Sir R. Bullard has spoken to his Soviet colleague and suggested that he should reassure his Turkish colleague. Sir R. Bullard thinks that one cause of suspicion may be a propaganda visit of Kurdish and other tribal leaders to Baku organised by the Soviet authorities. The Soviet Ambassador stated that this visit had been purely cultural but admitted that he had not been informed about it in advance.

On December 11th the Turkish Government communicated a second Aide-Memoire complaining that communications with Tehran had been virtually severed by Kurdish activities, that Kurdish revolutionary elements were being definitely encouraged by the Soviet occupying forces, and that a dangerous state of disorder had resulted.

Although the Turkish Government's information is much exaggerated there is a real danger that these developments may lead to estrangement between the Turks and the Russians and ourselves. It would therefore be helpful if the Soviet Government could do something to reassure the Turkish Government. According to Sir R. Bullard the main difficulty is that Soviet political policy in the Soviet occupied zone is run by an organisation over which the Soviet Minister at Tehran has little influence.

Copy.

1st January, 1942.

Sir,

In answer to the Memorandum on the Kurd affair in Iran which you were good enough to deliver to M. Molotov in Moscow on the 20th December, I am instructed by my Government to transmit the enclosed Memorandum.

Accept, Sir, the expression of my high consideration and esteem.

(Signed) J. MAISKY.

H. E. Mr. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs.

MEMORANDUM.

In reference to the Memorandum concerning the anxiety of Turkey regarding events in Persian Kurdistan delivered by Mr. Eden on the 20th December, 1941, to M. Molotov in Moscow, the reply is as follows:-

The information on the intention of the Kurds to organise an independent State and on the raids by Kurds on Turkish territory has only become known to the Soviet authorities from this Memorandum which is based on particulars given by the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In this respect it is necessary to remark that in that part of Iranian territory where there are Soviet troops no such incidents have occurred, and generally, the Soviet authorities have no connection with such acts or intentions of the Kurds. Nothing is known to the Soviet Government about trouble among the Kurds which, it is alleged, has been created as a result of assistance given to them by Soviet troops in Iran, as is mentioned in the British Memorandum. The assertion contained in another Turkish Memorandum, to which reference is made, that Soviet troops in Iran render assistance to the various groups of Kurds in fomenting trouble, is untrue. On the contrary, the Soviet troops take all the necessary measures to confine the arms held by the Kurds which trickle in to them from regions where no Soviet troops are stationed. Immediately after the arrival of Soviet troops in Northern Iran they did their utmost to prevent any conflicts breaking out between the Kurds and the Iranians, and so far, in those parts of Iran where Soviet troops are stationed, no conflicts or disturbances have occurred among the Kurds.

It is necessary also to point out that the Iranian government has not expressed any dissatisfaction with the behaviour of Soviet troops vis-a-vis Kurds, and has not submitted any complaints to the Soviet Ambassador in Iran. In this connection it can perhaps be mentioned that, according to information received from the Soviet Ambassador at Teheran, the Iranian Prime Minister, Pevazi, on the 11th December, 1941, in the presence of the Soviet Ambassador, stated to the British Minister at Teheran, that the British are supposed to support the Kurds who, in a number of districts were taking an unfriendly attitude towards the Iranians. However, there is no further information to hand on this matter. Thus, the Turkish Government should have no reason for anxiety on account of this alleged encouragement of the Kurdish population in Iran by the Soviet troops with a view to creating disturbances there and still less have they any reason in this connection to send their troops to the Turkish-Iranian frontier. From the above it is clear that there is no cause for estrangement in the relations of the Soviet Government with Turkey.

With regard to the visit made by certain Kurdish public men to Baku, this visit had no political significance and was of a purely cultural nature.

The assumption expressed by the British Minister, Sir R.W. Bullard, that Soviet policy in those parts of Iran where Soviet troops are stationed, was being carried out by organisations on which the Soviet Ambassador had very little influence, is without foundation.

All the considerations set out above could be transmitted to the Turkish Government if it would be necessary in order to dispel their anxiety, but it should be pointed out

that,

that so far, neither the Turkish Government nor the Iranian Government have ever made any demand to the Soviet Government on the question raised in the Memorandum submitted by Mr. Eden.

SOVIET EMBASSY,

1st January, 1942.

Copy.
(Z 261/21/34)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
17th January, 1942.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your note of the 1st January, communicating a memorandum prepared by the Soviet Government regarding the anxiety of Turkey respecting events in Persia Kurdistan.

2. His Majesty's Ambassador at Ankara has now reported that, on his return to Ankara from Moscow, he has spoken to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs in suitable terms with reference to recent Turkish communications addressed to the British Embassy on this subject. I am, however, drawing the attention of His Majesty's Ambassador to the statement in the memorandum communicated in your note under reply to the effect that the Turkish Government have never hitherto made any démarché to the Soviet Government on this question. His Majesty's Ambassador is being informed that, if the Turkish authorities wish to make any further enquiries on this point, they can be advised to address themselves direct to the Soviet Government, who will then no doubt furnish them with a full explanation.

I have, etc.,
(For the Secretary of State)
(Signed) Harold Caccia.

His Excellency

Monsieur Jean Maisky,

etc., etc., etc.,

Harrington House,

15, Kensington Palace Gardens, W.8.

Copy.

No. 2 252/21/34.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

21st January, 1942.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's note of the 1st January and my reply of the 17th January (2 251/21/34) regarding events in Persian Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. I feel that I should now bring to your notice certain further information on this subject which was conveyed to His Majesty's Representatives at Tehran and Ankara by the Persian and Turkish authorities.

2. From these reports it appears that the Kurds, Armenians and Assyrians at Resaich have formed a committee with the object of expelling the officials appointed by the Persian Government and setting up an independent local government in their place. There appears to have been considerable disorder in the town and it is said that a number of murders have been committed. As a result the Persian Governor and his officials have fled and His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz has stated that about 400 of the residents of Resaich, including the local notables, merchants and government officials, have fled to Tabriz.

3. The Soviet Government will agree that it is most desirable that public order and security should be maintained throughout Persia. If lawlessness were allowed to develop unchecked, our two governments might be obliged to intervene to restore and maintain order, thus immobilising considerable numbers of troops who might be urgently needed elsewhere.

4. Moreover, the spread of disturbances, such as might result if the Persian Government were not in a position to maintain law and order, might well affect the security of the routes by which essential military supplies are being sent to the Soviet Union. There can indeed be little doubt that serious disorders in the Persian provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan would affect the amount of military material reaching the Soviet Union through North-West Persia.

5. There is a further consideration which His Majesty's Government feel bound to bear in mind. Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugesson has reported that the Turkish Government, who continue to receive reports from Tabriz and Resaich of further disorders, are seriously disturbed by these developments so near their frontiers. In view of the interest expressed by Mr. Stalin during our conversations at Moscow in encouraging the Turkish Government to maintain their position as a bulwark against Germany, I feel I should point out that according to Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugesson anxiety over the situation in Persian Kurdistan is at present the chief obstacle to the improvement of Turco-Soviet relations. Owing to her geographical position Turkey is vitally interested in the maintenance of the status quo in Persian Azerbaijan. It is therefore most desirable that Turkey's fears on this score should be allayed, least if they continue they should react on her whole policy as regards the

His Excellency

was/

Monsieur Jean Maisky,
etc., etc., etc.,
Barrington House,
18, Kensington Palace Gardens, S.W.1.

war and even undermine her determination to resist a German attack.

6. His Majesty's Government recognise that it is clearly the duty of the Persian Government to maintain internal security throughout the country. They understand, however, that the Soviet Government have not felt able to allow the Persian Government to send troops or to reinforce the gendarmerie in the areas occupied by Soviet troops, while the local authorities at Tabriz and Resaih were ordered to reduce the police in these towns by one half.

7. If this is indeed the case I would suggest for the consideration of the Soviet Government that, since it is the duty of the Persian Government to restore order, they should be allowed to maintain as many police and gendarmerie in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan as they consider necessary, and should be allowed to support them with a reasonable number of troops. It also seems desirable that the Soviet authorities in these areas should be instructed to cooperate with the Persian authorities in restoring order.

8. I shall be grateful if Your Excellency will convey this suggestion to your government. I should perhaps add that the policy suggested above has been followed in the areas occupied by the British forces in South-West Persia.

9. Meanwhile, as regards the Turkish Government, I have instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Ankara, as indicated in my note of the 17th January, to suggest to the Turkish Government that they should approach the Soviet Government direct in matters of this kind.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

(Signed) Anthony Eden.

152

Iran: Kurds

152|42|42.

TELEGRAM.

How received :

From : FOREIGN OFFICE,
LONDON.

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,

BAGDAD.

CODE

Copies to :

Despatched : 16.2. 1850

Received : 17.2. 0930

Decyphered : 17.2. 0940

No. 190

of 16th Feb. 1942.

Addressed to TEHRAN No. 247 of Feb. 16.

Rptd. Bagdad No. 190

Angora No. 273

M. of S. Cairo, No. 117

Govt. of India No. 2939.

152|34|40|42 }

Your telegrams No. 185 and 209. I
agree with the line you propose to take and
approve of your proposal to send Oriental
Secretary on a tour of Kurdistan.SMK
JB/MRHe
Hof

please see

152|40|41|42|46|47

VIA 2

INDEX

Iran: Kurds

152 | 46 | 42

Cypher

from Tehran.

FOREIGN OFFICE.

170.

4th February 1942.

Addressed to Foreign Office	No. 170,
repeated to India	" 79,
" to Ankara	" 27,
" to Baghdad <u>SAVING</u>	" 23,
" to Cairo	" 20,
" to Kuibysheff "	" 6.

152 | 34 | 42 }

My telegram No. 157.

Prime Minister informs me that it was the day after the signature of the Treaty that the Soviet Ambassador gave permission for the despatch of troops to KHALKHAL. He states that the Ambassador at the same time conveyed assurances of his Government's good intentions towards Persia.

Copies:

BULLARD.

File,
Circ,
Saving BgD,
" Cairo,
" Kuiby'ff.

INDEX

152

Iran . Kurds

152/45/42

Priority.	Important.	T.O.O. 2225
Tel. No.	031.	
Date. 10/2		
Date recd. 10/2.		
From.	6 Ind Div.	
Addsd.	Tenth Army.	

CAN YOU ASCERTAIN WHETHER MOHD RASHID BEG ALIAS HAMA RASHID KHAN HAS BEEN TO WAINA RECENTLY AND IF SO WHETHER HE IS STILL THERE OR HAS RETURNED TO PERSIAN KURDISTAN.

Gen Staff
Gen Staff.

Copies to :-

EMBASSY. ✓
C.I.C.I.
G.S.(I).
C/C G(SD).
C/C (Ops):

✓ Mr. 2

No. 330/G,
Gen Staff Branch,
HQ Tenth Army.
11 Feb 42.

✓
BR.

INDEX

Iran : Kurds

152 | 44 | 42.

(152/44/42)

British Embassy,
Bagdad.

16th February 1942.

Dear Lyon,

- | 43 | - { I send you herewith a copy of
Memo No.G 330/ of the 9th February
from Tenth Army.

As we have not been asked to do anything about paragraph (1) His Excellency is taking no action at present but he suggests that you might find an opportunity to tell Jafar Sultan that Hama Amin is spoiling the chances of return to Iran of Jafar Sultan and the rest of his family and that he cannot expect us to help to secure if if Hama Amin continues to loot innocent ~~unresistant~~ villagers.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd.) V. Holt

VH
MR
RK

Q.62.
17.2.42.

LIEUT COL.W.A.LYON O.B.E.

INDEX

2/ an effort is then
made & think the
best course would be
for G^r Lyon to speak
to Pasha Sultan & tell
him that he must send
word to his son to return
the horses, if the displeasure
could be employed as pressure
would be more effective
than intervention by the Mu/-
or other Iraqi official.

On the other hand
Shurbakhi's story may
not be true, though I know
that Hama Army has
gone across the border &
we wrote to the way
good bye. At 14/2

Political intervention by us in the
manners proposed involves a dual obligation.
If we are to influence one side effectively
we must be able to influence the other; ^{also} as
if we tell a Hindu chief to abandon his men we
must be in a position to protect him from
execution after he has taken our advice.
We must have a Political officer to influence
both sides.

In this case I think Col. Lagan might see
J. S. place the only line he can take ^{is to} to
depreciate the loss of innocent Kandula
villagers.

PL 14/2

63.
We have been asked to make any representations
regarding Hama Ami's return & not do so until we
get something much more definite. But as by an imp-
act we think Hama Ami is going to
die. & tell him to leave J. S. & the rest of his family
chances of return to him & J. S. are not good & he
of that he cannot expect us to help to secure it if
Hama Ami continues to live innocent illness.

KC

14.2

Iraq: Kurds.

152/43/42

Copy of paras 2 and 5 of letter No 13 B/PA dated 3 Feb 42 received from the Political Adviser KERMANSHAH.

2. General SHAHBAKTI told me to-day that HAMA AMINBEG-I-JAAFAR SULTAN has collected a number of followers and rifles and is engaged in looting villages in the neighbourhood of AVROMAN and NAUSUD. He has enquired whether pressure can be brought to bear on HAMA AMIN's relations in order to secure his return to IRAQ.

5. I gather that there is a certain amount of uneasiness in IRAQ and elsewhere as to the possible effect on IRAQI KURDS should the Persians execute captured Kurdish rebel leaders. It is in my opinion impossible to expect that no executions will take place. The KURDS themselves know very well that if they fight the Persians and their leaders are captured they will be shot and I think that the execution of some of the leaders is necessary to prevent further trouble. As I have already remarked in a previous letter anything in the nature of wholesale reprisals should be prevented, if necessary by diplomatic action in TEHRAN. I do not think that a few executions should upset the KURDS and they are in my opinion necessary in order to deter other would-be leaders from starting trouble. As I understand that orders have been sent to General SHAHBAKTI not to carry out executions without reference to TEHRAN the damage of wholesale executions seems to be fairly remote, unless SHAHBAKTI disobeys his orders.



SECRET.
No G. 330/
Gen Staff Branch,
H.Q., Tenth Army.
9 Feb 42.

To, The British Embassy, BD.

Subject :- KURDISTAN.

¶ this view, c.g., The Force Commander heartily endorses WAZIRISTAN.

BR.

He W
para 2 refers to *Gen Staff*
affair deal with
yester 152/25/42

FED 9 1942

INDEX

*para 1 raises the question
whether an effort should be
made to get Hama Amine by
force back. 2/12/42
1/12/42 he has collected from Gal
10/12/42*

152

Iran: Kurds 152/42/42.

TELEGRAM.

How received :

From : H.M. MINISTER To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,

PARAP.

Q

TEHRAN.

BAGDAD.

Copies to : AOC

Despatched : 14.2.42 (1400)

GOC

Received : 14.2.42 (1900)

CCC

Decyphered : 16.2.42 (0910)

No. 47

of 14.2.42

rptd to

Addressed to FOREIGN OFFICE 208,

Govt. of India, 97,
Bagdad No. 47,
Angora No. 32,
Cairo No. 29/Saving.

My telegram No. 179.

Force occupying Saqqiz was a token force of one squadron only. On February 9th Kurds unexpectedly attacked and retook the town killing the General Officer Commanding Amini.

This reverse must inevitably affect the persian Government's attitude towards Kurdistan, see my telegram No. 185.

...

CW/SK/JP
RK
RK

Resubmitted

Q

14/2

INDEX

52
Iran: Kurds 152/41/42.

COPY.

To:- BRITMILAT retd TENTH ARMY.

From:- H.Q. 6 IND DIV.

123 12

Have the Persian Govt. formulated or issued any policy for dealing with Kurdish tribes as subjected (.) In particular what do they propose doing with 150 male and 300 female and child Galbaghi prisoners believed still held Diwan Darra and Qurveh respectively.

TOO 1550 LST THI 1600



No. G.S."I"/215/'I'(a).
H.Q. Tenth Army.
13 February, 1942.

To:-

H.B.M's Embassy
Baghdad.

Subject:-

KURDS.

Forwarded for information.

C. L. Pearson
Capt.
& B.G.S.

Copy to:-

C.I.C.I.

"G!"

Lt-Col.
G.S."I".

INDEX

152/34/42
Iran: Kurds 152/40/42
TELEGRAM.

How received :

PARAP

4 stars

From :

Sir R. Bullard,
Tehran.

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,

BAGDAD.

Copies to :

Despatched : 13/2/42, 19.40 hrs.

Received : 14/2/42, 11.00 "

Decyphered : " 11.30 "

No. 48

of 13th February, 1942

Addressed to FOREIGN OFFICE No. 209

Repeated to India,
Bagdad,
Angora,
Minister of State.

152/34/42 { Please add the following (as paragraph
No. 4.) to my telegram No. 185 of February 6th,
begins:-

4. I propose to send the Oriental Secretary presently to various places in Kurdistan to study the situation. He will do his best not to inspire the Kurds with baseless hopes or Iranians with suspicions. The danger from the Soviet encouragement of the Kurds in the North seems to have diminished at least for the present. Thanks to your representations for to the signature of the treaty or to both the Soviet authorities are assisting rather than hindering the Iranian authorities in restoring order.

CB/GDM
JM
RK

INDEX

Iran: Kermanshah. 152/39/42

Copy with combs to g.o.c., a.o.c., c.i.c. 1.(2), Col. P. J. P. (u/k 16/3024-1)
X X X X X X X X X X X X

No. 13/13/4/1165.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Ba~~g~~dad, 9th February, 1942.

Dear Mr. A.
20th
2



The Ministry of Foreign Affairs present their compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Bagdad, and, with reference to the Embassy's note No. 779 dated 30th December, 1941, have the honour to state that the Iranian Government had approached the appropriate Iraqi authorities about Hama Rashid Khan Winah and his activities in Iranian territory, asking that he should be induced to return to Iraq. The Iraqi authorities pointed out that Hama Rashid owned more properties in Iran than in Iraq and on that account was unlikely to respond to any invitation addressed to him to return to Iraq and take up residence in it. If, however, the Iranian authorities could ~~expel~~ ^{drive} Hama Rashid ~~out~~ from Iranian territory into Iraq, the Iraqi authorities would rivet their attention on him and take steps as necessary to remove him away from districts close to the frontier. The necessary steps have actually been taken in all frontier districts to watch the movements of Hama Rashid and as soon as the Iranian forces shall have succeeded in pursuing him ~~out~~ into Iraq territory, he will be arrested and removed away from the frontier districts.

The Ministry avail themselves of the opportunity to express their highest consideration and esteem.

His Britannic Majesty's Embassy.

Bagdad.

Get out from me

Archives

the "D'charts" will
suffice if there of no
by,
Mortar and a¹⁴⁶¹toco⁸³¹⁴⁶¹c
A.D.C., F.C.I.
John Duncan wants me to
have done the will Aug-10

~~Mr. Grunewald~~ wants me to
see him the 11th Aug - 0

Issue date Aug 2 1971 IND

الحكومة العراقية

وزاره الخارجيه

الدائرة السياسية

الشعبة الشرقية

الرقم ش/ ١٣ / ١١٦٥ / ٤

بغداد في ١٩٤٢ شباط



تهدى وزارة الخارجية تحياتها الى سفارة صاحب الجلالة البريطانية في بغداد وبالإشارة الى مذكرة السفارة المرقمة ٧٧٩ والمؤرخة في ٣٠/١٢/٩٤١ تتشرف بان تبدي ان الحكومة الإيرانية سبق أن فاتحت الجهات العراقية المختصة حول حمه رشيد خان وينه وما يعم به من أعمال في الأراضي الإيرانية وطلبت حمله على العودة الى العراق وقد اوضحت الجهة العراقية ان لحمه رشيد الموما اليه املاكا في ايران تزيد عما توجد له منها في العراق وعليه فلما من المأمول ان يلبي أي طلب يوجه اليه للعودة الى العراق والسكنى فيه . اما اذا تمكنت القوات الإيرانية من طرده من الأراضي الإيرانية الى العراق فأن السلطات العراقية ستوقفه بالمرصاد وتتخذ مايلزم لابعاده من المناطق القريبة من الحدود . ولقد اتخذت فعلا التدابير اللازمة في كافة مناطق الحدود لمراقبة حركات الموما اليه ومتى ما تمكنت القوات الإيرانية من مطاردته الى الأراضي العراقية فسيلق القبض عليه ويبعد عن مناطق الحدود . تنتهز الوزارة هذه الفرصة للأعرب عن فائق تقديرها واحترامها .



سفارة صاحب الجلالة البريطانية
بغداد

52
Iran: Guards 152 | 38 |

SAVINGRAM.

From: H.M. Minister, TEHRAN.

To: FOREIGN OFFICE.

No.: 165

Date: 3rd February 1942.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 165,
repeated to Ankara " 25,
" to Kuibysheff ... " 44,
" to Baghdad SAVING " 22, ↗
" to Cairo " " 19,
" to India " " 7.

Following received from TABRIZ, No. 24 of the 31st Jan.,

BEGINS:

outbreak of
There has been decline in brigandage and unrest
round SARAB which Governor-General openly declared due to
political
incitement of Soviet agents based on ARDEBIL. My Soviet
colleague denies this but has consented to send three
Russian officers with gendarmerie to calm down situation
which is at least a change from former attitude. ENDS.

He'el 12 - 3 hours
Bullard 12 2nd
17 Feb 1942



BULLARD.

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152
Iran: Kurds

152 | 37 | 42

SAVINGRAM.

From: H.M. Minister, TEHRAN.

To: FOREIGN OFFICE.

No.: 157

Date: 2nd January 1942.

Addressed to Foreign Office	No. 157,
repeated to India	" 74,
" to Kuibyshev <u>SAVING</u>	" 5,
" to Cairo	" 18,
2 to Baghdad	" 21
" to Ankara	" 24.

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Military authorities report improvement in the Soviet attitude on the subject of security during the last few days. Persian troops are being sent to quell disorder in the KHALKHAL area between MIANEH and ARDEBIL though at present Soviet authorities expect them to be withdrawn when operations completed. Soviet authorities no longer object to the employment of adequate numbers of police and gendarmerie at REZAIKH.

BULLARD.



W
12

MM:14/V

152
SAVINGRAM.

Iran: Kurds 152/36/42

From: H M. Minister, TEHRAN.
Date: 1st February 1942

To: BAGHDAD Saving No. 20,
" CAIRO " 2 FORMS
" INDIA " 5.

Following received from TABRIZ, No. 20, dated January 29th,

BEGINS:

I found order completely restored at REZAIEH by Soviet military authorities. Iranian difficulties are due largely to cowardice and inefficiency of leading officials on the spot and apparent lack of comprehension and inactivity in TEHRAN. Both police and gendarmerie in REZAIEH area practically useless rabble without immediate reorganization. Stories of dangerous Assyrian and Armenian Committees are exaggerated, although some small committees probably exist. The Iranians have shamefully persecuted and bullied these communities for years and probably have guilty conscience now that Government has virtually collapsed outside the towns. I strongly recommend to the Soviet military commandant preservation of order, and reasonable support and encouragement of feeble local authorities. Kurds to not appear to be giving trouble in REZAIEH ~~are~~ itself but are practically independent in their own districts. While the Soviet military authorities ~~be~~ have correctly but aloofly there are the same evidences of Soviet Political Officers meddling and tempering, especially with rural population as I have repeatedly reported in TABRIZ area.

2. I hear new Governor-General, ^{native} of AZERBAIJAN, is going to REZAIEH at once. It needs (1.g.u.) man of special character and tact with proper backing and authority otherwise I do not see how TEHRAN sovereignty can be maintained much longer except as a fiction.

3. My remarks do not include Governor R(----) now acting Governor-General who is facing position well. But he is a physically feeble man.

BULLARD.



MR: 142

X

152

Iran : Kurds 152/35/42.

TELEGRAM.

How received :

PARAP

to ~~forwards~~GOC
AOE
GOC
✓ W

From :

Sir R. Bullard,
Tehran.

Copies to : GOC

AOE

CIC

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,

BAGDAD.

Despatched : 6/2/42, 22.00 hrs.

Received : 7/2/42, 08.30 "

Decyphered : " 10.50 "

No. 43

of 6th February, 1942

Addressed to FOREIGN OFFICE No. 186
Please pass to Kuibyshev as 49Repeated to Govt. of India, 88,
Bagdad, 43,
Ankara,
Minister of State,
Cairo.152/35/42/1
My telegram No. 185, not repeated to
Kuibyshev.

+ wrong group

+ 1 change

+ 1 change

The Consul at Tabriz reports that a Kurdish Notable is keeping order at Sau + Bulag with the appogal of Tehran and that sanction has been given for a similar arrangement among Manakh tribes; and that according to the Acting Governor-general of Rezaieh two local sub-governors have been appointed in non-Kurdish areas of the Salmas +district but that an attempt to appoint a local Kurd in a Kurdish area failed because of inter-tribal jealousy.

CB/GDM
JM
RKto
forwards
✓ ✓ ✓

7/2

H. Edmonds
1 Dec 42note
Q.

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3152
Iran: Kurds 152/34/42

TELEGRAM.

How received :

From : H.M. MINISTER To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,

PARAP.

TEHRAN.

BAGDAD.

Le staner

GOC

AOC

C/CC

GOC

AOC

C/CC

Despatched : 6.2.42 (1420)

Received : 7.2.42 (0830)

Decyphered : 7.2.42 (0955)

No. 41

of 6.2.42

FIRST OF TWO PARTS.

Ø = gp omitted

7/2

Addressed to Ø T.O. No. 185,

rptd to

India,
Bagdad,
Angora,
Minister of State, &
Cairo.

152/24/42}

Your telegram No. 149.

Apart from military action, Iranian Government's measures affecting Kurdistan are these :-

(a) most of Kurdish chiefs who were in prison or in exile during the reign of the ex-Shah have been released,

(b) bill has been introduced regarding lands acquired by ex-Shah. This applies to all parts of the country but affected Kurdistan less than some other regions since except for valuable Kerind area little land there was acquired by the Shah. Bill is very complicated and difficulties are enormous so that results are not to be expected soon.

(c) a local magistrate related by marriage to Kalhurs has been appointed as Governor-General of Kermanshah and as reported in my telegram No. 179 a member of the Ardelan family has been made Governor of Saqqiz. It may be that the latter appointment helped to secure peaceful re-occupation of Saqqiz by Persian troops but appointment of Kurdish Governors is not universal remedy. Kurdish districts have been known to ask for Persian officials as more likely to be impartial. At the present time at least two Kalhurs are competing to become Governors of Shahabad.

....

SK/JP/CW
RK
RK

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152
TELEGRAM.

How received :

Parap

From : Sir R. Bullard,

TEHRAN.

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,

BAGDAD.

Copies to :

Despatched : 6.2.42 22.00 hrs

Received : 7.2.42 08.30 hrs

Decyphered : 7.2.42 12.10 hrs

No. 41

of 6.2.42.

Second of two parts.

+ wr. gp.

(d) Minister of Justice has promised H.M. Legation to try to procure just settlement of cases where lands of Kurdish Chiefs were either sold or exchanged for land elsewhere. + hearing Shahbakhti was said to be intending to shoot some of the captured Kurds as instigators of the revolt, Iranian Government issued instructions that no executions should be carried out except on orders from Tehran. In fact there have been I believe no executions.

2. Some grievances are common to the whole population e.g. corrupt officials and over taxation, while others are common to all tribal areas e.g. + chiefs exchange of land and transplantation of sections. Iranian Government are inclined to say that there are many general grievances, but no specified Kurdish grievances, but first paragraph above shows that they have not contented themselves with a policy of mere repression. I do not think we can do better than encourage the Government in their policy, and urge them to send some of their best officials to Kurdistan as + judges. Where suitable Kurds can be found, so much the better. It will also be necessary to go slowly with conscription in Kurdistan.

3. Task is extremely difficult for whereas most Iranians are incorrigibly corrupt and unconscientious, Kurdish ideal is plenty of smuggling and looting, no Government control and no taxation, minimum programme which any Government must impose viz establishment of customs, police, disarmament of persons not authorised to carry arms, and levying of minimum taxation must appear tyranny to Kurds. Greatest difficulty of all in my opinion is that of finding reasonably honest officials. Situation might improve in this respect, if as suggested in my telegrams Nos. 174 and 175 Iranian Government could secure the services of American officials in Revenue and Finance, and American Relief workers for organization of food distribution.

✓ ✓
Not seen

152
How received :

PARAP.

From : H.M. MINISTER To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,

TEHRAN.

BAGDAD.

Copies to : GOC
AOC
CIC

Despatched : 5.2.42 (1500)

Received : 5.2.42 (2100)

Decyphered : 5.2.42 (2200)

No. 40.

of 5.2.42

IMPORTANT.

rptd to

Addressed to FOREIGN OFFICE NO. 179,

India No. 83,
Bagdad No. 4,
Cairo,
Angora.

Persian troops occupied Saqqiz without opposition. Ministry of War state that Commanding Officer, accompanied, I understand, by the new Governor who is a Kurd of Ardelani family, went ahead and arranged amicably about the occupation.

RD/JP
RK
RK

W. Edwards
for
b/12

He VIII.
R. H. G. 6/12

WA 612

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152

Tehran - Kuibyshev 152/32/42

TELEGRAM.

How received:

From: Sir H. K. Hugessen To: H. M. AMBASSADOR,
ANGORA BAGDAD.

PARAP

Le yates (6)

GOC

AOE

CIC

M 61

Copies to: GOC
AOE
CIC

Despatched: 3.2. 1520.

Received: 5.2. 0500.

Decyphered: 5.2. 1115.

No. 32

of 3rd February, 1942.

Addressed to FOREIGN OFFICE No. 245.

Repeated to Tehran No. 19.

Bagdad No. 32.

Kuibyshev No. 12.

Your telegram No. 172*.

I asked the M.F.A. this morning whether anything further had transpired. I mentioned that we had made some approach to the Soviet Government.

2. The M.F.A. said that things were rather better; there was an improvement at Tabriz and Rezaiyeh and he understood that the Russians were taking a stronger line with disturbing elements.

CB/GDM
JB/MR

He VU
Note on
M 612

SECRET.

Baghdad the 31st Jan. 1942
2/2

P. S. No. 146.

H. B. M's Embassy,
Baghdad.

Memo.

Revd.

Classified

KOJ

W 6/2



I recently received a copy of a proclamation in Kurdish signed by "The devotees of the nation, the Committee for the Liberation of Kurdistan in the city of Sauj Bulaq in Mukriyan".

Although it is dated 16 Kharmanan - 6th September, 1941, I do not remember having seen mention of it in any reports. It is on a double sheet of lined foolscap and is the carbon copy of an original written by hand. Wherever the words "The Union of Soviet Republics" or "The Empire of Great Britain" occur, a space had been left for the words to be inserted in red ink, as is also the reference to "Mr. Churchill Prime Minister of Great Britain and Roosevelt President of the United States of America". It seems possible that in some places e.g. in extract (c) below, the Government referred to varied with the locality of distribution.

The proclamation is issued "In thankfulness for the liberation of the Kurdish Nation from the bonds of the cruelty and violence of the vile Iranian dictatorship".

The following references are of interest:-

- (a) "Our relations the Armenians achieved their aspirations with the help of the Soviet Union".
- (b) "In 1919 with the help of the Government of the Empire of Great Britain our brothers of Iraq obtained a small portion of the liberty which they desired".
- (c) "The Committee for the Liberation of Kurdistan" in spite of the presence of the dictatorial Iranian Government did not abandon its activity and, with the agreement of the Empire of Great Britain, sometimes openly and sometimes secretly continued to strengthen the feeling of patriotism".
- (d) "The Saadabad Pact was proposed by the Fascist Iran for the sole purpose of destroying the Kurds".
- (e) A tribute to the good behaviour of the Red Army.
- (f) A reference to the eight points of the Charter issued by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt on board the Potomac and endorsed by the Soviet Union: "The Soviet Government will not allow a nation which has been liberated by it from its misfortunes to be cast again into the chains of captivity by others".
- (g) "The officials left behind among us by the former Iranian Administration are only considered to be temporary guests with no official status".
- (h) "The Committee has taken over the entire administration of the country in accordance with the views" of the two Governments.

(j) "Long live the protectors of the freedom of the nations, the Government of the Union of Soviet Republics and the Government of the Empire of Great Britain."

Moscow
ADVISER,
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.

Copy to:-

C. I. C. I., Baghdad.

Lieut:Colonel W. A. Lyon, O.B.E.